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It is not usually desirable to speak of illness especially if nervous in char-
acter, but illness and threat of illness have played so large a part in my
life that it is impossible to omit reference to them ....
-Samuel Williston
I. INTRODUCTION
P Samuel Williston's .autobiography, whole pages are devoted to
ecollections of playing billiards.' Williston recalled passing many
* New York Stock Exchange Division of Enforcement. Opinions expressed in this article
are those of the author and are not necessarily those of the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. or
any of its officers. Thanks are due, for their assistance and comments, to Edward Wright Boyer,
Kathleen Dicks Boyer, Roscoe A. Boyer, Allan Farnsworth, Michael Hofiheimer, John Honnold,
Willard Hurst, Duncan Kennedy, Alfred Konefsky, Ian Macneil; Edward Murphy, Joseph
Perillo, Jack Schlegel, Richard Sherwin, Michael Sinclair, Avi Soifer, and Steve Thel, and to the
library staff of the New York County Lawyers' Association. And to the memory of Anthony
Barkeley-Smith, il miglior fabbro at the billiard table.
1. SAMIUEWILSTON, LIFE AND LAW 59-61, 294-97 (1941) [hereinatrLIFzEAND LAW].
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afternoons around the table of the old Colonial Club in Cambridge,
resort of Harvard teachers and Boston merchants. He recalled
walking one or two evenings a week, three miles each evening, to
play billiards at a club in Belmont, Massachusetts. He recalled the
Century Club in Manhattan and how he had played billiards there.
Williston played with colleagues from Harvard's mathematics
and history departments, his friend the college organist, and his law
school colleague Edward H. Warren. "In some way my interest in
billiards became known to many of my pupils," he added, "and for
most of the first ten years of the century I had a weekly engagement
with a succession of friendly young men," students who became law-
yers and bankers throughout the nation.2
The years in which Williston was playing billiards, from about
1895 to about 1930, were the years in which formalist jurisprudence
dominated American law. The vision of Harvard men playing bil-
liards, in fact, provides a striking visual metaphor for legal formal-
ism. This school of thought had been enshrined at Harvard Law
School by Christopher Columbus Langdell and his disciples. To have
studied law at Harvard, in that era, was to belong to the elite who
controlled the courts, the morning-coated gentlemen who argued
cases and the black-robed judges who decided them.'
The geometry of the billiard table suggests the geometric pre-
cision to which formalism aspired. The game's fixed boundaries,
clean angles, and carefully calculated forces stand in for formalism's
rigid categories, facile oppositions and gradations, and allegedly un-
swerving logic. And if billiards can be played too sharply, if players
sometimes put english on a ball or quietly hustle a stranger-well,
that could be said of formalism, too. Formalism often insisted on
hairsplitting grounds of decision-but where vested interests were
involved, courts could give concepts like substantive due process an
unexpected and preternatural elasticity.
Williston was one of the high priests of formalism. His fondness
for billiards can be related to a philosophical predilection for ab-
straction. It can even be given cultural connotations, when one con-
siders that he learned to play the game in Newport in the early
2. I& at 297.
3. Commenting on "the great age of the American law school," Grant Gilmore re-
marked:
It may well be that no educational institutions in any country at any time have
enjoyed the prestige and achieved the success of the dozen or so national law
schools which grew up in the image of Langdell's Harvard. To be accepted as a
student-or at all events to survive the cut at the end of the first year-at one of
these schools was a guaranty of success. To be a professor of law on one of the
great faculties was to hold a passport to fame and fortune.
GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 57 (1977).
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1880s, and that he once saw Herbert Spencer at the billiard table.'
This association connects billiards to the opulence of the Gilded Age
and to the Social Darwinism which Spencer championed-which in
turn connect with the neoclassical economic theory which paralleled
such thinking, the formalistic jurisprudence which reflected it, and
the Nineteenth Century's blinkered understanding of contract law.
Such constructs are a little too fanciful. It is true that Williston
was one of Langdell's star pupils. It is also true that he was disposed
to let logic, as well as experience, play a part in shaping the law.
Much of Williston's reputation for formalist thinking, however, in-
volves the attribution of guilt by association. A clearer understand-
ing of his treatment of contract law can be gained from his own
statements of what billiards had meant to him:
When I began to study law and for ten years thereafter, I rarely touched a
billiard cue. Later, when I was slowly recovering from a breakdown, bil-
liards proved a great resource .... 5
During the latter part of my convalescence when I was away from home I
was often able to find opportunity for a game and subsequently I have al-
most always managed to find a friendly enemy.
6
The breakdown of which Williston speaks here was more than a
convalescence. It was a series of nervous breakdowns which hit him
very hard, personally and professionally. These collapses cost him
more than four years of work, forced him onto a regimen of addictive
and highly toxic medication, cycled him through clinics, and de-
pressed him so badly that he tried to resign from the Harvard fac-
ulty.
Williston's fondness for billiards speaks volumes about the
definition he gave to contract law. He did not approach the game as
an exercise in abstraction; he valued it for having helped him.
Similarly, he did not see the structure and order of contract law as a
matter of pursuing form for form's sake; in hope of establishing or-
der, he favored structures which promised stability and certainty.
If Williston's treatment of contract law sometimes suggested
too closely the precision of the billiard table and if he preferred
simple answers when issues called for more sophisticated treatment,
this also may have been because he had struggled, successfully, to
reassert control over a shattered inner life. After his breakdown, he
had made his own way back. While billiards helped, the only effec-
tive remedy was work-in a sense, the work which made the author.
Williston's concern with precision and structure, on both the per-
4. LIFE AND LAW, supra note 1, at 61.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 294.
1994]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
sonal and professional levels, reflected an intrinsic need for order.
The patterning of forms and principles which produced Williston's
treatise on The Law of Contracts was the same structuring process
which organized the life of Samuel Williston.
I1. WILLSTON'S MALADY
Both achievement and insecurity marked Willistoen's back-
ground. Known for charities and service, his family had also suffered
quarrels and estrangement along religious lines. Its prosperity
rested on the money it earned-substantial in good times, but never
vast enough to be locked away in dynastic trusts. By the time Willis-
ton began his own career, the money was not to be counted on, and
stress had begun to crack open the fault lines.
A. Heredity and Family Environment
Williston's paternal grandfather, William Richards, was one of
the missionaries who sailed from Massachusetts to Hawaii in 1822.
Richards organized the island kingdom's first code of laws, influ-
enced the Hawaiian Constitution, Bill of Rights, and Edict of Tol-
eration, and organized the first school system. He labored there for a
quarter-century, a vigorous reformer and evangelizer, indefatigable
until over-work killed him.7
Samuel Williston, Williston's adoptive grandfather and name-
sake, was arguably the richest man in western Massachusetts. His
fortune came from organizing a business his wife Emily had started:
the manufacture of covered buttons. At its height, this enterprise
employed more than a thousand families, and from it Samuel ex-
panded to pursue interests in banking and railroads. The Dictionary
of American Biography describes him as a philanthropist, who had
made gifts to Amherst College, Mount Holyoke Female Seminary,
the American Board of Commissions for Foreign Missions and Wil-
liston Seminary, now Williston School, which he founded. But while
his life seemed to link piety with worldly success in the tradition of
New England, the dark side of his Calvinist faith seemed to foresee
7. Williston wrote an article about Richards for the June 1937 issue of The New
England Quarterly. Not approving of the editorial changes made by the Quarterly, Willis-
ton then wrote a monograph which he had privately printed. See SAMUEL WILLISTON,
WILIAM RICHARDS (1938).
Richards enjoys a modicum of celebrity through the work of another author, whose
books rival his grandson's for monumentality. He apparently served as the model for
missionary Abner Hale in JAMES A. MICHENER, HAWAII (1959).
Throughout this section, unattributed statements of fact regarding the Williston
family are digested from LIFE AND LAW, supra note 1, at 4-35. See also 10 DICTIONARY OF
AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 309-10 (Dumas Malone ed., 1964).
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setbacks. His namesake commented:
It seems odd in these days that a man of some education and superior in-
telligence, with many contacts with the world, should be agonized with
fear that he was not one of the elect, and that, irrespective of the propriety
of his conduct, he was, nevertheless, fated to eternal damnation; yet such
was Mr. Williston's attitude of mind during a large part of his life.
* * In justice to him, it should be said also that when I best remember
him he was at least seventy-five years old and that he was oppressed by
business anxieties. His successful career as a manufacturer induced him
when he was past seventy years old to undertake a new venture-the
Williston Mills, devoted to cotton manufacture. The enterprise proved un-
successful, and I remember hearing him say in my presence that it had
cost him half of his fortune.
8
Levi Lyman Richards, who would become Williston's father,
was born on the island of Maui in 1830. Brought back to New Eng-
land at the age of seven, he was reared in the Samuel Williston
household. Even before William Richards died in the Pacific, the boy
had put aside the names his father had given him. It was as Lyman
Richards Williston that he chose to be known.
Lyman graduated from Amherst College, taught at Williston
Seminary, and became engaged to a prominent minister's daughter.
Appointed to teach Latin at Amherst, he touched off a scandal by
declaring that he had become a Unitarian. This crisis of conscience
angered his family and fiancee. It also disturbed the college, and
cost him the professorship. Editorials were written about it. His
family eventually welcomed him back; Amherst did not. He moved to
Boston and became a schoolmaster-sometimes within the public
schools, sometimes as head of a private school for girls. During the
late 1870s, needing more money, he decided to make it by speculat-
ing in stocks. He lost heavily in 1878 and again in 1882.9 His son
remembered new disadvantages, and restricted family income-all
of which had to be endured-but Lyman scraped through. He fed
and clothed his children, paid the tuition of those who went to col-
lege, and ensured that his school stayed in family hands. He was not
a Puritan, but something of the ethic survived in him.
Samuel Williston had seven brothers and sisters. Older brother
James, the eldest son, belonged to the Boston and New York Stock
Exchanges. He served as a broker for James R. Keene and Russell
8. LIFE AND LAW, supra note 1, at 5.
9. Id. at 34, 39. In 1874, when the elder Samuel Williston died, Lyman received a
$50,000 bequest of stock in the Williston family enterprises. However, a shift in fashion
changed the family fortunes; covered buttons went out of style. 'he long, black coats that
all well dressed men had worn were superseded for everyday wear by suits of mixed col-
ors with horn buttons." Id. at 33; see also C. D. Collins, A Button That Endowed a Semi-
nary, HOBBIES, July 1941, at 32.
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Sage, which, on the Wall Street of those days, was like being a two-
fisted sea-captain with Francis Drake or Sir John Hawkins. Arthur
was an engineer and college administrator. Constance went to
Smith College, taught at girls' schools, and painted. Helen married a
college professor. Emily worked as a housekeeper for wealthy fami-
lies, and later cared for her mother.
Two other sisters, Alice and Mabel, were much less fortunate.
Alice, a successful piano teacher, had a nervous breakdown in 1888.
She never quite recovered. Over the next two decades, although
sometimes well enough to take courses at Radcliffe College or man-
age the family ledgers, she spent most of her time bedridden, suffer-
ing "a tendency to severe digestive attacks."" In 1908, she made one
last effort at rehabilitation, leaving Boston for the country. "For a
time the stimulus of congenial occupation buoyed her up," her
brother sadly noted, "but the inevitable reaction came and this time
with such severity as to cause her death.""
Mabel's fate was even sadder. Williston remembered that she
was "a bright and enthusiastic girl, but somewhat afflicted with the
shyness that with several of us prevented easy social contacts."12 She
taught in the school her father had started, but
at about thirty years of age she suffered, like several others of the family,
a nervous breakdown.... Proper treatment of such cases was not so gen-
erally understood then as now. I think Mabel might easily have been re-
stored to health if she had been sent at once to a good sanitarium, but the
family doctor simply put her to bed in charge of a nurse, and allowed her
to lie awake all night. Her mind became somewhat unbalanced and turned
to destruction, so that she had to be put under restraint in an institution.
After several years she was sufficiently restored to return home and made
herself helpful there for a few years. But the impulse that had been so
strong for years returned in a moment of despondency, and she destroyed
herself.'
3
Alice's breakdown marked the real beginning of the Williston fam-
ily's struggle with mental illness. 4 Mabel's deterioration and death
took place over the same span of years in which Williston himself
was in and out of sanitariums. In describing his sisters' tragedies, he
wrote of suffering he himself had managed to survive.
10. LIFE AND LAW, supra note 1, at 11.
11. Id. at 12.
12. I& at 13-14.
13. Id. at 14.
14. Beset by financial troubles during his son Samuel's last year of high school, Ly-
man Williston had been admitted to the Sanitarium at Clifton Springs, New York in
1877-78. I& at 34. Regarding Clifton Springs, see SAMUEL H. ADAMS, LIFE OF HENRY
FOSTER, M.D.: FOUNDER, CLIFTON SPRINGS SANARIU (1921).
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B. Illness and Incapacity
For Williston, insecurity seems to have been a persistent
trouble. Perhaps the most surprising aspect of his career is the way
in which anxieties and doubt gnawed away at him. Describing his
boyhood, he wrote:
I did not like to be laughed at. Fear of this not only restrained me from at-
tempting to sing [in school choruses] but also from displaying the incom-
petence of a beginner in boyhood games.
Doubtless in modem phraseology, I had an inferiority complex in some
directions, but I do not think it occurred to me to pity myself or to be un-
happy, though I had my bad moments.' 5
Long after he had been recognized as America's best-known law pro-
fessor, with a career spanning forty-seven years, he expressed his
choice of career as if he had chosen it by default.
The impression received from others in my boyhood and in my college
days, which I assumed to be rather well founded, that I was not of much
importance outside of my family had been hard to eradicate.
My success as a student in the Law School did indeed convince me that
I could do well in the bookish side of the law .... I knew that I was not
well fitted for cajoling or dominating hostile witnesses in order to confute
them; and the bargaining, negotiating, and compromising that form a
large part of lawyers' dealings with one another were not suited to my tal-
ents. Especially too, in the art of attracting clients, I felt that I should not
be a success.
16
During his first year of teaching, student questions often stumped
him. Success only introduced new doubts: "I have often feared in
later years after I had grown gray and had gained some repute, that
there was too polite and facile acquiescence by my students for their
own good .... 17
Williston was particularly sensitive to matters of money. He
had reason to be; he was short of it. Due to his father's investment
losses, he had to spend time away from college during his last se-
mester, taking a job connected to the Northern Pacific Railway.
Between college and law school, he would spend three years work-
ing, two years with the railroad's survey project and one as a teacher
in a boarding school. In 1887, after his second year of law school, he
became engaged to Mary Wellman. Money was so short that she told
him not to buy her an engagement ring until he could buy it out of
his first substantial professional fee. This was the first sacrifice she
15. LIFE AND LAW, supra note 1, at 19-20.
16. Id. at 140.
17. Id. at 133-34.
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would make. By the time she received her engagement ring, her old-
est daughter would be nearly twelve years old.
18
When Williston wrote his autobiography at the end of the
1930s, he could recall precisely how much Harvard professors had
been paid in 1890.19 Even his own home life found itself described in
economic terms:
[I]n November [18911 Dorothea, the first of our two daughters, was born,
her name being inspired by the heroine of George Eliot's novel of Mid-
dlemarch. She proved a difficult and expensive infant to raise. I had hoped
that my income, which, for that year, was slightly more than $3,000,
would be sufficient for our purposes, but the expenses for the year in fact
amounted to about $4,000.20
In the early 1890s, stresses were accumulating. In 1892, Lyman
Williston retired from teaching. In 1893, a financial panic sent the
nation into a two-year depression. Around this time, the Williston
family found itself faced with a number of large expenses: treatment
for Alice and Mabel, Constance's tuition at Smith, and the purchase
for James of a seat on the New York Stock Exchange.2 ' In Williston's
own household, there were the expenses of raising Dorothea and her
younger sister Margaret, born in October 1894.
The titles of Williston's early publications reflect these con-
cerns. His first law review article, published in 1888, dealt with
tracing commingled trust property, a legal echo of loss and be-
trayal.22 In 1891, he addressed whether an insolvent debtor could in-
sure his life for his wife's exclusive benefit and discussed how to
18. Id. at 84, 272.
19. From Williston's account of his hiring, it is possible to reconstruct virtually the
entire salary structure of the Harvard Law School-the pay of law professors versus the
pay of instructors in the academic departments, the pay of full professors versus that of
assistant professors, the sliding scale of salary increments and how this correlated with
time in service. Id. at 129-31. Williston even set down in excruciating detail why he de-
layed in leaving private practice:
My salary as assistant professor was to be $2,250 for the first two years, and
$2,500 for the remaining three, but my term of service did not begin until Sep-
tember 1st, and as President Eliot carefully explained, Harvard salaries were
then paid quarterly and not in advance. So my wife and I decided to remain in
Brookline for the ensuing year.
Id. at 131.
20. Id. at 135.
21. James R. Williston was first admitted to the membership of the New York Stock
Exchange on May 12, 1894. In his application, he affirmed, "I have plenty of means to pay
for the membership, but as I want more capital my father will put in 30 or 40 thousand
dollars." Application of J.R. Williston for Admission: Minutes of N.Y. Stock Exchange
Committee on Admissions (May 3, 1894) (on file with the Buffalo Law Review).
22. Samuel Williston,'The Right to Follow Trust Property When Confused with Other
Property, 2 HARV. L. REV. 28 (1888).
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carry out attachments on debtors who had fled overseas.3
As an assistant professor of law, Williston consistently turned
down opportunities a more ambitious man might have taken: offers
of deanships at three other law schools, a position as reporter to the
Massachusetts Supreme Court (which was considered a stepping-
stone to that august bench). He also faced publication deadlines on
three books. One was a supplement to Langdell's Contracts case-
book, another a Sales casebook for a course taught by James Bradley
Thayer. He also had under way a revised edition (actually the eighth
edition) of Theophilus Parsons' The Law of Contracts. This last pro-
ject, which assumed a significant shape in his career, Williston
termed a "somewhat disappointing experience."24
In the face of these pressures, Williston seems to have become
more intense. He began studying late in the evenings, resolved to
teach himself Italian.
In the spring of 1895 I was appointed a full professor from the following
September. The salary of a full professor had previously been nominally
increased, but it was now put on a more extensively sliding scale than be-
fore with $500 less as the initial salary than had been the case. That is, it
was fixed for the first five years at $4,000 and after three successive peri-
ods of five years it would rise to $5,500. I was in no mood to find fault,
however; I was receiving some income in Boston and something from my
writing, and my prospects seemed all that I could wish, with no hint of the
trouble in store for me.
25
The tense detail of those middle sentences belies the confidence of
that last sentence. Mary Williston sensed that something was awry.
Unsuccessfully, she tried to persuade her husband to slow down.
The first symptoms were bad circulation and loss of concentra-
tion. Next came muscle spasms, "severe and increasing nervous re-
flexes, especially in my left foot, whenever I tried to read or study."
26
Insomnia set in. Following a specialist's advice, Williston tried to
work himself out of his discomfort by exercise and "exhausting bicy-
cle rides."27 By November, he felt compelled to take a leave of ab-
sence for the rest of the school year.
Travel was advised. Williston went south to Washington,
23. Samuel Williston, Can An Insolvent Debtor Insure His Life for the Benefit of His
Wife?, 25 A. L. REv. 185 (1891); Samuel Williston, The Validity of Attachments Made
Abroad by Creditors of An Insolvent Debtor, 5 HARV. L. REV. 211 (1891).
24. LIFE AND LAW, supra note 1, at 138-40,258.
25. Id. at 141.
26. Id. at 142. Throughout this section, unattributed statements of fact relating to
Williston's breakdowns are digested from LIFE AND LAW, supra note 1, at 142-66.
27. Id. at 143. As an undergraduate, he had won an athletic letter in track and field
sports for riding the high bicycle. Id. at 42-44; see Austin W. Scott, Samuel Williston, 76
HARv. L. REV. 1330, 1331 (1963).
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planning to sit in on the trial of a case he had briefed. This was a
mistake. In that distant city, the separate symptoms coalesced into
breakdown.
I found the weather chilly and disagreeable. My friends were busy in the
daytime, and I was not in a sufficiently comfortable condition for evening
amusements, nor could I do much reading even of light fiction, for the re-
flexes caused by reading were increasingly troublesome. All that seemed
possible was to take long walks through the streets. Unquestionably I
over-exerted myself and after some days I awoke one night with my head
so flushed that I should have thought that I had a fever if my pulse had
not still been regular....
Thereafter, I could neither take much exercise physically or mentally,
nor could I sleep.28
A local doctor prescribed bromide (probably potassium bromide).
This relieved his insomnia but failed to produce a cure.
From Washington, Williston went directly to a sanitarium at
Clifton Springs, New York.29 At Clifton Springs, they practiced hy-
drotherapy, "three treatments a day, two wet and one dry; that is,
two involved total or partial immersion, and one was either massage
or electrical treatment."3 The water cure was pursued in conjunc-
tion with the rest cure. "Insomnia was a major difficulty, and any
excess in physical or intellectual activity, and most of all any emo-
tional stress, accentuated it."
31
Williston did not leave Clifton Springs until June 1, 1896, more
than five months later. Unable to work during the fall semester,
institutionalized during winter and spring, he had lost an entire
year.
Williston lost the next year, too. Rest and a warmer climate
were advised. He spent six weeks in Bermuda and the early part of
the spring in Virginia. Money was becoming tight; Harvard had
voted to consider him on sabbatical, with half pay. He seemed to be
making a recovery. However, in August 1897, just before the fall se-
mester was to begin, he had a relapse, and it was clear that he
would not be able to teach during the 1897-98 school year.
A change of scenery was advised. Williston went to California,
carrying letters of introduction, looking for "some suitable fruit
ranch where [he] could do light work."32 He did not know if he could
go back to teaching and he did not know how he would earn a living
if he could not teach. That troubled him. He knew that his wife was
28. LIFE AND LAW, supra note 1, at 144.
29. Id. at 144-48.
30. Id. at 145.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 155.
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rearing two small children alone in a house where the furnace did
not work properly, economizing so that he could spend time in a
warmer climate. That troubled him, too. But the change seemed to
be having an effect. He could pore over briefs for an hour or two at a
time now.
During the next academic year, 1898-99, he was back at the law
school, teaching a light load-one course on the new Bankruptcy Act
of 1898. As soon as the fall semester began, his insomnia returned.
With the aid of sedatives, "hypnotics," he weathered the crisis. By
the end of the school year, he was able to work five hours a day.
That next fall, September 1899, Williston began teaching a full
load of courses: Contracts, Sales, and Bankruptcy. Again he broke
down. This time nothing could help him to sleep or relieve persistent
back pain.
I therefore abandoned my work and returned to Clifton Springs. This time
the treatment there did not restore my sleep. The physicians of the Sani-
tarium finding the old hypnotics of slight use, abandoned them and tried
packing me in a cold, wet sheet, putting ice bags on my spine and head,
and other hydropathic devices, but I could get only an hour or two of
sleep.33
The doctors tried paraldehyde and sulfonal. Neither worked. Appar-
ently, it was at this juncture that Williston offered his resignation,
which Dean James Barr Ames did not accept. The patient's morale
sank: "Hope grew gradually dim, and one Sunday morning a wave of
despair overwhelmed me with the conviction, by no means unrea-
sonable, that all was lost."
34
At this low ebb, in December 1899, Mary Williston learned of
Dr. John Gehring, a physician in Maine. She traveled to Clifton
Springs, had her husband discharged, and took him north to the
Gehring Clinic. Gehring used hypnotism. He also prescribed medi-
cation: "heavy doses of bromide of strontium during the day.., as
well as the sulfonal at night."
35
33. Id. at 160.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 161. The Gehring clinic adhered to a strict daily routine. Patients were
awakened at six a.m. and denied breakfast if they were not in the dining room by seven.
After a brief rest, each patient was required to saw a specified number of logs, the total
being checked by the clinic handyman. Dr. Gehring then briefly interviewed each patient
in a darkened room, with the patient lying down while Dr. Gehring spoke in a low voice,
instructing the patient that the symptoms complained of could not be continued. After
lunch, patients engaged in outdoor sports. "In the evening only patients wearing formal
dress were permitted to come to dinner, which was followed by readings, dramatic per-
formances, charades, games, lectures, and lantern slides." LAWRENCE KUBIE, THE RIGGS
STORY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AUSTEN RIGGS CENTER FOR THE STUDY AND TREATMENT
OF THE NEUROSES 4 (1960).
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Under this regimen, Williston improved. By March he was able
to leave the clinic. That fall he returned to teaching a full schedule
of courses. "In the following twenty-five years, though more than
once troubled by attacks of insomnia for several weeks at a time
which compelled me to limit closely my work and exercise, I never-
theless carried on my full work at the Law School .... "16
Essentially, he had turned the corner. There was one more bad
breakdown, in 1903. What precipitated this change, Williston did
not record. This time his recuperation was shorter; he spent two
months with Gehring, decided the clinic was doing him no good, and
went back home. He continued to dose himself with "the only hyp-
notic that remained effective," a potent "mixture of bromide and
chloral.37 Between 1903 and 1912, whenever troubled by insom-
nia---"two or three attacks, of perhaps two months each"-he fol-
lowed a similar pattern. 8
By 1912 I found that the new drug veronal was perfectly effective and
produced no apparent ill consequences; and my mind being thus set at
rest, I was content with the knowledge of the existence of a satisfactory
remedy, and though I occasionally, though rarely, made use of a mild
hypnotic, I did not take another dose of veronal after 1912 until 1923. It
was during these years... that I enjoyed, or at any rate exercised more
fully than at any other time, a regained power of work. During these years
I wrote my treatise on contracts, consisting of three large volumes with an
additional volume of index, and table of cases, and also prepared a much
enlarged second edition of my treatise on sales in two volumes, first pub-
lished in 1909.3
9
Clinics and sanitoria had become a familiar environment. In 1923,
"[iun consequence, presumably, of allowing myself too great freedom"
Williston's nervous troubles reappeared. 4 He went to Stockbridge,
Massachusetts, to a clinic run by Austin F. Riggs, where he stayed
for two months. He returned to Stockbridge in the summer of 1924,
having worn himself down by playing eighteen holes of golf six days
a week and walking five miles on Sunday.41
The drugs which Williston took were potentially deadly. Potas-
sium bromide can be deadly; it achieves its soporific effects by slow-
ing down the heart. Sulfonal was a trademark name for sulfonmeth-
36. LIFE AND LAW, supra note 1, at 161.
37. Id. at 163.
38. I&
39. Id. at 163-64.
40. Id. at 164.
41. In the autumn of 1929, after Mary Williston died, Samuel was admitted to a
sanitarium in Cromwell, Connecticut. While a patient there, he was awarded the first
American Bar Association gold medal "for conspicuous service to American jurispru-
dence." Id at 327.
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ane. At Clifton Springs they gave him 15-grain doses; a 30-grain
dose would have killed him. Paraldehyde was less toxic than sul-
fonal, but equally addictive. Veronal was barbital, an early barbitu-
rate. It too was highly addictive. Chloral hydrate, which Williston
took over the longest period of time, was arguably the most danger-
ous of these medications. Chloral was highly potent: the underworld
knew it as the active ingredient of knock-out drops. It was also
highly toxic. The standard dosage, 15 grains, had been known to
cause death. Moreover, its use frequently led to what was called "the
chloral habit."42
Incredibly, given the nature of these drugs, Williston's doctors
allowed him to set his own dosages-to determine for himself how
much he took and when. This was perhaps the most dangerous as-
pect of what Williston called "my strained relations with Mor-
pheus."43 It began with Dr. Benjamin Loveland, during Williston's
first stay at Clifton Springs.
Bromide of potassium would give me some sleep, but the effect would
wear off in an hour or two .... I was given a bottle of the medicine with
instructions as to the proper dose, but with permission to repeat it as
often as necessary. I was told that the expectation was that I should find
myself able gradually to diminish the frequency of the doses and that I
should do so as rapidly as I found it possible.
Several but not all of the physicians whom I have had in subsequent
years have objected to my knowledge of hypnotics and to my regulation of
the doses that I should take. For my own part, I think... [this] method
was helpful in bringing about my recovery and was one of the main rea-
sons why I ultimately became able to do continuous work in spite of my
inability to prevent recurrent attacks of my trouble.... [Tihe method cul-
tivated the self-dependence which is of vital necessity for a nervous inva-
lid .... 4
It is clear that Williston considered himself an expert on sedatives.
It is equally clear that some of his doctors thought he knew too
much. What doses he took is not certain. The level was so high, how-
ever, that toxic effects began to show within two days, whenever he
began taking the bromide-chloral compound. His behavior also ex-
42. ALFRED W. HERZOG, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE 552, 929 (1931). Regarding chlo-
ral's toxicity, see Davis v. State, 113 S.E. 11 (Ga. 1922) (addressing murder by poisoning
when chloral was introduced into bottle of whiskey); Rosenbarger v. State, 56 N.E. 914
(Ind. 1900) (addressing attempted murder by chloral hydrate). For Agatha Christie, vero-
nal was often the poison of choice. See AGATHA CHRISTIE, THE MURDER OF ROGER
ACKROYD (1926); AGATHA CHRISTIE, THIRTEEN AT DINNER (1934).
43. LIFE AND LAW, supra note 1, at 164.
44. Id. at 146. During the academic year 1898-99, Williston's "good friend and family
physician, Dr. Herbert B. McIntire," advised him to continue his teaching "with such aid
from hypnotics as might be necessary." IL at 158.
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hibited the exhilaration which was symptomatic of chloral addiction.45
To some extent, Williston recognized these dangers: "I do not
commend the extensive use of hypnotics that I have made. They are
treacherous and I have never been quite happy during the periods
that I have taken them. But it has been 'Hobson's choice.' Without
them my career would have ended with my thirty-fifth year."
46
II. "AMERICAN NERVOUSNESS": NEURASTHENIA AND
AMERICAN CULTURE AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY
Williston generally declined to name what he called "my mal-
ady." Only once did he suggest a name: "nervous exhaustion."41 From
this casual reference, however, it is possible to identify the disorder
that plagued him.
In 1869, the New York neurologist George M. Beard coined a
term which would achieve great medical and cultural vogue over the
next half-century. The term was neurasthenia-literally, nerve
weakness. In these decades, as cultural historian Francis G. Gosling
has written, neurasthenia would be applied to "practically every
nonspecific emotional disorder short of outright insanity, from sim-
ple stress to gross neuroses."4 Neurasthenia was nervous exhaus-
tion (another phrase Beard favored). It was the nervous collapses
people had, after which men were sent West to live the rugged life
and women were sent to spas to take the waters. It was shattered
nerves. It was artistic temperament. It was the stress of overwork,
the tragic strain that cut short promising careers.
The list of symptoms which Beard compiled showed the diffi-
culty of defining the disorder. Neurasthenics suffered from
insomnia, flushing, drowsiness, bad dreams, cerebral irritation, dilated
pupils, pain, pressure and heaviness in the head, changes in the expres-
45. Id. at 163. Williston observed a throat irritation which became severe within "a
night or two." Id. He noted that, during his breakdowns, "[niormal sense of fatigue largely
ceased to operate. Often exhilaration rather than a sense of fatigue followed attempts to
go beyond what my nervous system would bear." Id. at 146. Exhilaration has been identi-
fied as a symptom of chloral intoxication. HERZOG, supra note 42, at 552 ("[A] chloral
habitud is likely to be excited and very talkative in a flighty manner.").
During this same period in Britain, it was also suspected that "addiction to chloral or
morphine was the sole cause of functional neurosis" in many patients who complained of
continuing nervous trouble. JANET OPPENHEIM, "SHATTERED NERVES": DOCTORS, PA-
TIENTS, AND DEPRESSION IN VICTORIAN ENGLAND 115 (1991). Dr. Gehring, who was known
for restricting his patients' drug intake, was himself plagued by rumors that he person-
ally used such medications. See KUBIE, supra note 35, at 4.
46. LIFE AND LAW, supra note 1, at 166.
47. Id. at 142.
48. FRANCIS G. GOSLING, BEFORE FREUD: NEURASTHENIA AND THE AMERICAN




sion of the eye, neurasthenic asthenopia, noises in the ears, atonic nose,
mental irritability, tenderness of the teeth and gums, -nervous dyspepsia,
desire for stimulants and narcotics, abnormal dryness of the skin, joints,
and mucous membranes, sweating hands and feet... fear of lightning, or
fear of responsibility, of open places or of closed places, fear of society, fear
of being alone, fear of fears .... 49
Beard hypothesized that neurasthenia was caused, specifically,
by exhaustion of the nerve cells. Heredity determined how much
"nerve force" (quasi-electrical energy) an individual possessed-i.e.,
how much stress he or she could bear.50 The neural structures could
be overcome by shocks or strains, overwork, fear, grief, or illness,
which broke down the neural circuitry. Collapse also threatened if
nervous energy were not carefully husbanded. Metaphors of bank-
ruptcy were common. One neurologist likened the patient "to a bank
whose specie reserve has been dangerously reduced, and which must
contract its business.., or to a merchant, who has expanded his
business beyond what his capital justifies .... "-"
The most prominent neurasthenics were "brain-workers" who
had pushed themselves too hard: businessmen seizing new oppor-
tunities, professionals taking on too large a practice, women who
insisted on higher education.52 A breakdown could result if nervous
energy were dissipated through sexual or speculative mis-
adventures. However, "if patients were sensitive and refined enough
to begin with, neurasthenia could be brought on, irregardless of
their moral probity, by simple exposure to the hectic pace and
excessive stimuli of modern life."53 Such individuals could be helped
only if they cut back on their expenditures of nerve force.
No organic cause for neurasthenia could be found. The models
of personality and cognition, upon which modern psychology relies,
had not yet been established. In default of better explanations, neu-
rologists explained neurasthenia in terms of environmental fac-
49. GEORGE M. BEARD, AMERICAN NERVOUSNESS: ITS CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES at
viii-ix (reprint 1972) (New York, G.P. Putnam's Sons 1881). It is likely that Alice Willis-
ton's "digestive attacks" were considered a symptom of neurasthenia, as anorexia nervosa
was among the disorders comprehended by this diagnosis. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 45,
at 212-15.
50. Sources for Beard's theory included Herbert Spencer, Thomas Edison, and Her-
mann von Helmholtz. See Charles E. Rosenberg, The Place of George M. Beard in Nine-
teenth-Century Psychiatry, 36 BULL. HIST. MIED. 245, 249 (1962).
51. J.S. Greene, Neurasthenia: Its Causes and Home Treatment, 109 BOSTON MED.
& SURGICAL J. 75, 77 (1883), quoted in Gosling, supra note 48, at 85-86.
52. GOSLING, supra note 48, at 100 (citing S.W. Hammond, Neurasthenia, 14 VT.
MED. MONTHLY 158 (1908)); Edward Howisbrook, Neurasthenia, 9 TRANS. IOWA ST. MED.
SOc'Y 188 (1892); Charles H. Hughes, Neurotropia, Neurasthenia, and Neuriatrica, 15
ALIENIST & NEUROLOGIST 215 (1894).
53. TOm LUTZ, AMERICAN NERVOUSNESS, 1903: AN ANECDOTAL HISTORY 4 (1991).
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tors-the culture in which its sufferers lived.
Neurasthenia, Beard argued, was due to the intensity of mod-
ern life, the sudden onslaught of "steam power, the periodical press,
the telegraph, the sciences, and the mental activity of women."
4 It
deserved to be called American nervousness because the pace of
technological and cultural change was greatest in the United States.
"American nervousness is the product of American civilization,"
Beard triumphantly proclaimed.5 His disciple A.D. Rockwell elabo-
rated:
In the older countries, men plod along in the footsteps of their fathers,
generation after generation, with little possibility and therefore little
thought of entering a higher social grade. Here, on the contrary, no one is
content to rest with the possibility before him of stepping higher, and the
race of life is all haste and unrest. It is thus readily seen that the primary
cause of neurasthenia in this country is civilization itself, with all that the
term implies, with its railway, telegraph, telephone and periodical press
intensifying in ten thousand ways cerebral activity and worry.
6
In short, neurasthenia was the shock of the new.
Williston was clearly familiar with the prevailing explanation
of neurasthenia. His family's history of mental illness, he com-
mented, derived from "no other inheritance than a strong physique,
derived from my mother's family, insufficiently supported by the
more delicate nervous organization on my father's side. 5 In his own
case, he admitted to being "in the offensive language of the neurolo-
gist, a hypersensitive"q---but then asserted, quickly and defensively,
that his breakdown
was not due to any mental twist. Since entering the Law School as a stu-
dent, I had been markedly successful, both from an objective standard and
from my own point of view. My domestic life was happy, and it seemed to
me that I was riding on the top of the wave. I had no worries and there
were no "bees in my bonnet." But I had pushed a delicate machine too
hard.59
In the literature of neurasthenia, such explanations are classic.
The idea of a mental structure outmatched by its physical frame was
a basic tenet of contemporary neurologists' belief in the importance
of heredity. Williston's metaphor of the overworked machine was a
54. BEARD, supra note 49, at 96.
55. Id. at 176.
56. A.D. Rockwell, Some Causes and Characteristics of Neurasthenia, 58 N.Y. MED.
J. 590 (1893), quoted in GOSLING, supra note 48, at 12-13.
57. LIWE AND LAW, supra note 1, at 14.
58. Id. at 143.
59. Id. at 143-44.
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favorite one.6° Similarly, the therapies which Williston suffered-
electrotherapy, hydrotherapy, and various forms of the "rest cure7-
were all prescribed for neurasthenics.1'
Williston saw his troubles as central to the story of his life. He
wrote: "Illness and the threat of illness have played so large a part
in my life that it is impossible to omit reference to them in any
autobiographical account...." 2 Moreover, his struggle to impose
coherence on his inner life is reflected in the observations which
preface his Contracts treatise:
One who attempts to write on any topic of the law is likely to realize that
what Maitland said of the historian is also true of the law writer,-he is
tearing a seamless web....
In view of this it might be thought the part of wisdom to be content to
work within smaller compass; but the law of contracts suffers from a diffi-
culty opposite to that which has hampered the development of the law of
torts.... Only in recent years has much effort been made to knit together
with broad general principles the various kinds of torts. The law of con-
tracts, on the other hand, after starting with some degree of unity now
tends from its very size to fall apart.63
The seamless web torn by the legal writer might be the law's exis-
tence as a comprehensive and interrelated system; but these words
can also describe that scholar's psyche, strained by the effort and
ambition of such an undertaking-as Williston thought his own had
been. To work within a smaller compass may exemplify a narrowed,
penetrating legal analysis-but this is also what neurasthenics were
taught to do, to conserve nerve energy by restricting activity. And
when Williston portrayed the law of contracts as falling apart-at
the very moment when he had just completed a massive treatise, or-
ganizing tens of thousands of cases along lines of principle and logic,
producing a formalist masterpiece which unified different kinds of
legal agreements into one great empire of contracts-he character-
ized his task as a Sisyphean one. This recalled, in a different con-
text, the endless cycle of useless therapies he had endured.
Williston's introduction to the study of contract law draws on
the rhetoric of neurasthenia-which means that it deals with his
presentation of the law in the same terms which had defined his
psychological struggle. His preface expressly presents contract law
in terms of the contrast between order and disintegration, between
60. See GOSLING, supra note 48, at 104 (citing William 0. Stillman, Neurasthenia, 40
MED. & SURGIcAL Rpm. 398 (1879)).
61. Id. at 108-27.
62. LIFE AND LAW, supra note 1, at 142.




process and entropy. This personal connection is inescapable. To
understand the forms in which Williston presented the law of con-
tract, we must consider his work in light of his inner battle.
IV. FORMALIST LEGAL CULTURE
A. Formalism
The age of neurasthenia was the age of legal formalism. Today,
no one has anything good to say about formalism, no more than
contemporary psychologists make diagnoses of neurasthenia. 4 As
Thomas Grey has remarked, legal historians have published "nearly
a century of polemics against 'mechanical jurisprudence,' 'Bealism,'
'transcendental nonsense,' and similar targets, set up for summary
demolition."65 To this list of pejoratives one might add "classical or-
thodoxy," Grey's own term, and "classical legal thought," a phrase
coined by Duncan Kennedy.66
So one-sided has been the discussion of formalism that only
with some effort can we describe the jurisprudential system under-
neath its caricatures. Nonetheless, some things are certain. The
practitioners of formalist jurisprudence believed that they had em-
barked on a scientific enterprise. They asserted (and may have be-
lieved) that law operated as a value-free, apolitical, objective, logical
system. The law could answer every question put to it, there was one
right answer to every legal question, and every issue could be rightly
resolved through reference to principle. Formalism, Professor Grey
has aptly written, "describes legal theories that stress the impor-
tance of rationally uncontroversial reasoning in legal decisions,
whether from highly particular rules or quite abstract principles."67
If law was a complete and comprehensive system, it was also a
beautifully symmetric system. Formalism held that the bottom-line
rules which decided cases could ultimately "be derived from a small
number of relatively abstract principles and concepts, which them-
64. In the second edition of the AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION'S DIAGNOSTIC
AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 40-41 (2d ed. 1968), neurasthenic neu-
rosis was described as "chronic weakness, easy fatigability, and sometimes exhaustion."
When the third edition was issued in 1980, neurasthenia no longer appeared except as a
subcategory of minor depressive episodes. GOSLING, supra note 48, at 26-27.
65. Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 5 (1983).
66. Id. at 2 (citing Duncan Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Classical Legal Thought
1850-1940 (Oct. 1975) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Charles B. Sears Law
Library, State University of New York at Buffalo Law School)); Duncan Kennedy, Toward
A Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness: The Case of Classical Legal Thought
in America 1850-1940, 3 RES. IN L. & SOC. 3 (1980) [hereinafter Kennedy, Historical
Understanding].
67. Grey, supra note 65, at 9.
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selves [formed] a coherent system."6
Stare principiis was one of the axioms which defined formalism.
Dean Langdell made this phrase a formalist watchword with his
celebrated postulate that "Ilaw, considered as a science, consists of
certain principles or doctrines."s9 His related observations, that "the
number of fundamental legal doctrines is much less than is com-
monly supposed" and that the "vast majority" of reported cases were
"useless, and worse than useless," as illustrations of legal principles
in operation, gave formal thought the imprimatur of ideology.70
Langdell's most rigid disciples would treat lawmaking as a
process of rigorous deduction from such basic principles. Joseph
Beale would assert that "the decision and judgment of a court, de-
termining a particular controversy.., can in no sense be regarded
as in itself law."7 ' "What is the law as Beale defines it?" Jerome
Frank sarcastically asked.
"Law... is made in part by the legislature; in part it rests upon prece-
dent; and in great part it consists in a homogenous, scientific, and all-em-
bracing body of principle...." This all-embracing body of homogenous
scientific principle constitutes a "philosophical system." Such systems are
"truly law" even "though no court has lent its sanction to many of their
principles."
7 2
In short, Beale believed that law was precisely what Justice Holmes
said it was not, a brooding omnipresence in the sky.73
Another facet of formalism was its belief in fine lines and neat
categories, distinctions which were purportedly cognizable on logical
grounds. Distinctions made differences. Judicial decision-making
was viewed as the recognition of proper distinctions rather than the
active shaping of government policy. Lines were drawn between
public and private realms (ignoring the role played by the state in
protecting individuals' agreements and interests). Distinctions were
drawn between substance and procedure, so that procedure became
an end in itself.74
68. Id. at 8.
69. C.C. LANGDELL, SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS at viii (1879).
70. Id. at viii-ix.
71. JER O ME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 48 (2d ed. 1931).
72. Id. at 51-52.
73. This satirical point was made by Frank. Id. at 55.
74. Courts reserved consideration of the substantive issues in order to issue proce-
dural rulings which effectively decided the case in question--overlooking the fact that
adjective law had been designed to facilitate the resolution of substantive issues. In one
instance of great particularity, a court, construing a statute which provided for partial
summary judgment within a class of defendants, drew a distinction between judgment in
favor of Defendant A and judgment against Defendant B. Roscoe Pound cited this case,
Egaard v. Dahlke, 109 Wis. 366 (1901), as "the acme of technicality." Roscoe Pound, Me-
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Formalist jurisprudence represented the ossification of earlier
stages in the development of American law.
The development of the common law in America was a period of growth
because the doctrine that the common law was received only so far as
applicable led the courts, in adapting English case-law to American con-
ditions, to study the conditions of application as well as the conceptions
[in which courts envisioned their work] and their logical consequences.
Whenever such a period has come to an end, when its work has been done
and its legal theories have come to maturity, the jurisprudence of concep-
tions tends to decay. Conceptions are fixed. The premises are no longer to
be examined. Everything is reduced to simple deduction from them. Prin-
ciples cease to have importance. The law becomes a body of rules.
75
Existing rules were elevated into the category of self-evident veri-
ties. In practice, this meant that the law turned a blind eye to social
and economic concerns-thereby setting itself, deliberately or un-
wittingly, against social change.
76
This intransigence toward social evolution (and the reform leg-
islation which made it manifest) lies. behind the blackest charge
against formalism. Customarily, it has been assumed that formalist
claims of objectivity and neutrality were subterfuges which masked
a program of savage political reaction, a campaign by conservative
judges to slap down the modern age. History makes out a prima fa-
cie case for such interpretation: the landmark decisions of the for-
malist age are those which strike down laws regulating business or
protecting workers. 7
Dividing the law into neat compartments limited the possibility
of change and reform.78 The state's power of eminent domain had
once posed the possibility that the government might be able to re-
distribute wealth. The power to condemn assets and reallocate the
chanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REv. 605, 618 n.53 (1908).
75. Pound, supra note 74, at 611-12.
76. Morris R. Cohen, A Critical Sketch of Legal Philosophy in America, in 2 LAW: A
CENTURY OF PROGRESS 266, 289 (Alison Reppy ed., 1937).
77. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding that a statute limit-
ing length of work week was an invalid infringement of liberty-of-contract rights of work-
ers who might wish to work longer hours); In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895) (approving a
federal injunction for use against strikers); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1
(1895) (holding that the Sherman Act which barred monopolization of"commerce" did not
apply to monopolization of "manufacture"); In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98 (1885) (invalidating a
ban on cigar making in tenements as an infringement of individual's right to follow any
lawful calling).
78. See Aviam Soifer, The Paradox of Paternalism and Laissez-Faire Constitutional-
ism: United States Supreme Court, 1888-1921, 5 LAW & HIST. REV. 249, 250 (1987)
("[Uinder the guise of a formalistic, unitary vision of categories such as individual auton-
omy and citizenship, the Justices subdivided and manipulated legal doctrine about suit-
able protection in a way that arrogated tremendous discretionary power to themselves.").
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property rights which they represented seemed potentially that
broad. Such actions, when they resulted in lawsuits, were discussed
in the politicized language of public benefit and economic improve-
ment. Formalism tamed this possibility, which had been exemplified
in cases involving mills and streams, by reading the decisions which
employed it as riparian-rights cases. Rather than possessing a gen-
eral power to reallocate property rights, the state wound up with the
ability to authorize the building of mill-dams. "By 'formalizing' the
inquiry-that is, by reclassifying the problem into a supposedly
nonpolitical doctrinal category-[the courts were] able to defuse its
general redistributive significance."79
Formalism willingly turned the force of the law against those
outside acceptable society. It followed the letter of the law in exclud-
ing would-be immigrants of Chinese nationality.80 Under the belief
that separate would and could be equal, it upheld Jim Crow laws
across the South."' Moreover, formalism sanctioned private violence
against marginalized populations. Fine lines helped make this ac-
ceptable. Owen Wister, who had studied law at Harvard (alongside
Williston, his undergraduate friend), took space in The Virginian to
defend lynch law on the Western plains. There was a crucial dis-
tinction, Wister argued, between burning Southern Negroes in pub-
lic and hanging Wyoming rustlers in private.82
Where courts smiled on the drawing of distinctions, one could
legitimate any course of conduct by distinguishing it from something
that was worse. Contrasted with the indefensible, the questionable
became arguable-even acceptable.
B. Williston and Formalism
Williston and his work have been discussed as part and parcel
of this black legend. Thus, in 1937, it was written that "Williston's
work must command respect from all those who value coherence and
thoroughness; but it is meeting with an ever increasing volume of
79. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860, at 261
(1977).
80. See, e.g., United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253 (1905).
81. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
82. OWEN WIsTER, THE VIRGINIAN 275 (1902); see Allen D. Boyer, Formalism, Real-
ism, and Naturalism" Cross-Currents in American Letters and Law, 23 CONN. L. REV.
669, 671-72 (1991).
Silas Weir Mitchell treated Wister for neurasthenia by sending him to recuperate in
Wyoming, where he developed his sympathy for what he called "popular justice." Mitchell
was the same neurologist who treated Charlotte Perkins Gilman for neurasthenia by
sending her to a darkened room and instructing her that she must never write again.
Wister authored The Virginian and Gilman wrote The Yellow Wallpaper.
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discontent from those who wish to understand how the law actually
works and what social realities determine its development."83 More
recently, in 1977, it was written that the jurists and law professors
of the Gilded Age
could elaborate a legal ideology of formalism, of which Williston was a
leading exemplar, that could not only disguise gross disparities of bargain-
ing power under a facade of neutral and formal rules of contract law but
could also enforce commercial customs under the comforting technical ru-
bric of "contract interpretation."8
4
And even more recently, in 1991, it was written that the law of con-
tracts, as formulated by Williston, "was a matter of precise se-
quences, objectively manifested intentions, reciprocated actions, and
absolute consequences," a formalism that would "be crystallized in
the serial declarations, absolute as any other catechism, which be-
came the Restatement of Contracts."85
The nineteenth century's conjectures about neurasthenia, all
the theories and therapies which were so acceptable at the turn of
the century and now seem to be the work of quacks and crackpots,
should teach us to beware of explanations which rely upon percep-
tions of culture. Many labels have been applied to formalist juris-
prudence, and many of these have been projected onto Williston.
This is unwise. Generalizations relate only generally to particular
cases and culture cannot entirely explain the individual. Sooner or
later, we must put aside the reputation and come to grips with the
man.
In his day, Williston was diagnosed as neurasthenic. Today he
would be treated for depression, with a better prognosis for recovery.
Legal thinking should be at least as open to change as medical
analysis. If comments about Williston in the 1990s merely recapitu-
late what was said about Williston in the 1930s, our thinking may
be due for reappraisal. It may be just as misleading to treat Willis-
ton as a formalist exemplar as it was to treat him as a neurasthenic.
V. THE UNEASY FORMALIST
The man whom one encounters in the pages of Williston's
writing is not the blithe, unruffled platonist whom legal history has
made familiar. He is just as genteel, just as scholarly. He is just as
83. Cohen, supra note 76, at 290. This sentiment was echoed again in 1973: "Samuel
Williston built a monumental fortress (1920-22) out of the law of Contracts, volume after
volume, solid, closely knit, fully armored against the intrusion of any ethical, economic, or
social notions whatsoever." LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HIsTORY OF AUIERICAN LAW 593
(1973).
84. HORwIrz, supra note 79, at 201.
85. Boyer, supra note 82, at 678-79.
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neat. With his courtly manner and bushy white moustache, he is
just as much the charming old professor. He lives comfortably within
existing society and believes that there are good reasons for things
being as they are. There is, however, little which is reactionary
about his philosophy-and, from a reactionary's point of view, he is
disturbingly soft on the modem age. He believes law is a science, but
not an exact science. He likes to quote people who talk about public
policy and sociological jurisprudence. The formalist age had its ex-
emplars-ogres like Justice McReynolds, amiable muddlers like
Chief Justice Fuller, stern and persuasive prophets like Langdell-
but the man who authored Williston's The Law of Contracts is not
exactly of their company.
A. Form and Structure in Willistonian Contract Theory
Clearly stamped on Williston's methodology was a conscious
desire for form and structure. His jurisprudence featured certain
watchwords: stability, certainty, predictability, rule, principle, gen-
eral, harmonize. All these terms might have been found in the same
section of a legal thesaurus. To bring them together bespoke a vision
of law as an organizing and stabilizing system.
Williston held up simplicity and certainty as intrinsic values
toward which the law should aspire.
[A]s to some things investigation is not necessary to prove that they are of
social advantage. The proposition for instance can safely be made that,
other things being equal, simplicity of law is desirable. So also the greater
degree of certainty with which a court's decision on a given state of facts
can be predicted, the better it is for society, other things being equal.8 6
The law should be envisioned as simply as possible, and should be
established as certainly as possible, in order to provide "rules of ac-
tion which may be relied upon without litigation."87 He elaborated:
"A system of law cannot be regarded as successful unless rights and
duties can, in a great majority of instances, be foretold without liti-
gation."8
Certainty could be attained through effective generalization.
"Broad general rules are simple," Williston declared. 9 The way to
achieve certainty, through broad general rules, was to follow prin-
ciple. "Founded on sound principles" was Williston's highest praise,
86. SAMUEL WILLISTON, SOME MODERN TENDENCIES IN THE LAW 151 (1929)
[hereinafter MODERN TENDENCIES].
,87. Id. at 95.
88. LIE AND LAW, supra note 1, at 209.
89. MODERN TENDENCIES, supra note 86, at 95.
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and "to follow principle" was for him the path of merit and virtue."
Williston's favorite principle, of course, was bargain consideration."
The presence of consideration, as if it were a chemical tracer, was an
infallible indicator of an enforceable agreement. The absence of con-
sideration was so notable a failing that it precluded many reason-
able arrangements. It hindered the collection of rewards,92 allowed
offerors to revoke offers which by their terms stated that they would
be kept open,93 and prevented the compromise of debts.' It put at
risk people who had to complete a performance before receiving the
compensation which had been promised in return, whether they
were walking across a bridge or laboring for a year without interim
salary payments.95
In one particularly sinuous passage, Williston explained how
consideration analysis meant that people who had offered bonus
payments to their employees were free to go back on their word:
Where A and B have entered into a bilateral agreement, it not infre-
quently happens that one of the parties, becoming dissatisfied with the
contract, refuses to perform or to continue performance unless a larger
compensation than that provided in the original agreement is promised
him.... On principle the second agreement.., is invalid for the perform-
ance by the recalcitrant contractor is no legal detriment to him whether
actually given or promised, since, at the time the second agreement was
90. This is perhaps most clearly shown in Williston's comments on other scholars'
work. See Samuel Williston, Book Review, 29 HARV. L. REV. 114, 114 (1916) (reviewing
PHEROzEsHAH N. DARUVALA, THE DOCTRINE OF CONSEDERATION (1914)) (criticizing the
author for his "little attempt to coordinate in accurate statements of principle the author's
conclusions"); Samuel Williston, Book Review, 25 HARV. L. REV. 575, 576 (1912)
(reviewing CLARENCE ASHLEY, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1911)) (commenting that the
author's method of "seeking the sound and reasonable principle rather than merely stat-
ing what courts have decided [is] the most interesting feature of the book").
91. According to Williston,
[i]n order to make a bargain it is necessary that the acceptor shall give in
return for the offeror's promise exactly the consideration which the offeror re-
quests. If an act is requested, that very act and no other must be given. If a
promise is requested that promise must be made absolutely and unqualifiedly.
LAw OF CONTRACTS, supra note 63, § 73.
92. Id. § 74.
93. Id. § 55.
94. Id. § 120.
95. Williston wrote: "The offeror may see the approach of the offeree and know that
an acceptance is contemplated. If the offeror can say 'I revoke' before the offeree accepts,
however brief the interval of time between the two acts, there is no escape from the con-
clusion that the offer is terminated." Id. § 60b. No better example of formalist line-draw-
ing could be offered. "Though the majority opinion in Petterson v. Pattberg [161 N.E. 428
(N.Y. 1928)] does not follow Section 45 of the Restatement of Contracts, the excellent
opinions in that case would have been impossible without Professor Williston." Ira P. Hil-
debrand, Book Review, 17 CORNELL L.Q. 319, 320 (1931-32) (reviewing SAMUEL WIL-
LISTON, CASES ON CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1930)).
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entered into, he was already bound to do the work; nor is the performance
under the second agreement a legal benefit to the promisor since he was
already entitled to have the work done.9
6
With certainty went objectivity. Williston's test for the admis-
sibility of parol evidence-i.e., for determining whether a written
instrument contained the entire agreement between the contracting
parties-hinged on whether the asserted additional terms were rea-
sonably related to the written documentf7 Most notably, in the area
of contract formation, Williston was instrumental in replacing the
earlier "subjective" test for contract formation, which depended upon
the contracting party's intent, with a test which analyzed only the
communications exchanged between offeror and offeree.
[Tihe test of a true construction of an offer or acceptance is not what the
party making it thought it meant or intended it to mean, but what a rea-
sonable person in the position of the parties would have thought it
meant.98
A person's intent to contract was to be measured not by his or her
actual intention, but by what he or she had actually said.99
Williston was willing to pursue simplicity even if this meant
sacrificing sophistication. At a meeting of the American Law Insti-
tute, Walter Wheeler Cook criticized Williston's proposed definition
of "contract," which identified "promise" with "contract," due to the
desirability of distinguishing carefully between the 'factual events' (the
promises) and the resulting legal relations' attached by the law to the
promises. Professor Williston replied that he felt "satisfied that to make
the restatement in that form would make it unintelligible to a large part
of the Bar and Bench and destroy its practical value."
100
96. LAW OF CONTRACTS, supra note 63, § 130. When discussing Williston, it is
traditional to cite this passage. Compare GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 23
(1974) with Charles Thaddeus Terry, Book Review, 34 HARV. L. REV. 891, 894 (reviewing
SAMUEL WILLisTON, THE LAw OF CONTRACTS (1920)).
97. SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 633 (3d ed. 1957);
see JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLo, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 147-50 (3d ed.
1987).
98. LAW OF CONTRACTS, supra note 63, § 94. Historically, Williston traced the rea-
sonable exception analysis to earlier forms of the common law: "Neither of the two earlier
actions (an action on the case for deceit and an action of debt) from which the action of as-
sumpsit was derived, involved as a necessity mutual assent to the creation of an obliga-
tion." Samuel Williston, Freedom of Contract, 6 CORNELL L.Q. 365, 368 (1921)
[hereinafter Freedom of Contract].
99. Williston was left unscathed in JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MN
(1930). However, Frank made up for this omission by criticizing the objective theory of
contract in a dissenting opinion from the federal bench. See Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R.
Co., 153 F.2d 757, 760-70 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank, J., dissenting).
100. Walter Wheeler Cook, Book Review, 33 ILL. L. REv. 497, 501 (1939) (reviewing
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Williston's belief that legal rules could be made simple rested
upon the belief that language could be made simple-that words had
plain, infallible, unmistakable meanings. In drafting the Restate-
ment, Williston recalled, one of the codifiers' tasks had "involved the
expression of our rules with brevity in language that could not be
misunderstood."10 He admitted that eradicating ambiguity had been
hard, but did not doubt that this goal had been attained.
In fact, this represented a willingness to believe that customary
meanings were plain ones, to rely upon the accepted. In seeking a
phraseology that could not be misinterpreted, Williston did not
analyze and reanalyze familiar concepts, splitting a general mean-
ing ad infinitum into its constituent parts. Where he stopped, and
that he sometimes stopped too soon, was pointed out by Arthur
Corbin. Williston opened his treatise, Corbin noted, by defining a
contract as "a promise or set of promises to which the law attaches
legal obligation."102 But the term's actual meaning was never quite
explained.
It is only in a later chapter that [Williston] attempts to define "promise"
and nowhere does he analyze or define "obligation." These terms are not
self-explanatory. In section 24, it is said that "A promise from the very
meaning of the word involves an undertaking to do something in the fu-
ture." But what is "the very meaning of the word"?.1
0 3
Williston treated his definition of "contract" as what it could not be,
a self-proving proposition.
Simplicity of paradigm was equally desirable-and, in reality,
proved equally illusive. Williston's paradigmatic contract was the
one-shot sales transaction. While business entered the era of tele-
communication, the multi-division corporation, and government
price controls, he continued to teach contract law through hypotheti-
cals involving the sale of a horse named Dobbin.
04
SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1938)).
101. LIFE AND LAW, supra note 1, at 311 (emphasis added).
102. Arthur L. Corbin, Book Review, 29 YALE L.J. 942, 942 (1920) (reviewing
SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1920)).
103. Id. With the shudder of someone who had mastered Hohfeldian terminology
only to see it used improperly, Corbin further noted one sentence which confused the con-
cepts of privilege, right, and power: "'The personal privilege of the infant is a right which
can be exercised against anyone.'" Id. at 944.
104. Dobbin was sometimes accompanied by a cow called Bossy. See George C.
Thompson, Book Review, 26 CORNELL L.Q. 369 (1941) (reviewing SAMUEL WILLISTON,
LIFE AND LAw (1941)).
Compare a pulpit-thumping sermon delivered by Karl Llewellyn, scion of an evan-
gelical family, during the same era:
[I1n Sales cases, no static concept is at home. The essence of the Sales transac-
tion is dynamic.... [Tihe commercial contract for sale, the shifting of goods to
market via a factor, the shipment against draft, the installment sale, the deliv-
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In treating contract law as a single realm unified by common
principles, Williston found it necessary to smooth over tensions and
gaps within the case law. In drafting the Restatement of Contracts,
he recalled that one challenge
related to stating for all the United States a single rule upon points where
the decisions of the courts in the several states had established divergent
rules. This difficulty could not be wholly avoided, but the only way that we
could choose was to select as the rule of the restatement that which
seemed best to harmonize with the general principles of the subject, un-
less reasons of practical convenience made this undesirable.'
0 5
The goal was to promulgate the best of all possible rules. Logic of-
fered the means of suppressing conflict as well as the rationale for
doing so.
Such analyses, however, could not magic away into obscurity
all "divergent" cases. If principle were to provide a truly compre-
hensive theory of contract law, all cases had to be dealt with. When
decisions could not fit within the rule, they could be treated as ex-
ceptions. This allowed for a semblance of order. No matter how se-
vere the conflict in the decisions, all cases could be described as
either present (within the rule) or otherwise accounted for.
10 6
In fact, if the rules were to be stringent-and Williston meant
that they should be-the exceptions were necessary. 107 Labeling in-
consistent holdings as exceptions to the rule meant that the rule re-
flected only those cases most consistent with it. Covering a smaller
universe of cases, a rule could be stated more categorically.
When Williston turned to stating positive law, his approach
was responsible for the most notable doctrinal innovation of twenti-
ery or shipment on approval, the agreement to sell goods lying in warehouse
under nonnegotiable receipt-these are not one-stroke transactions. They in-
volve, each one, a complicated series of actions of varying significance. They in-
volve a period, often an extended period, during which matters [of "ownership"
or "title"] are in temporary suspension or are in active flux between the par-
ties ....
Karl N. Llewellyn, Through Title to Contract and a Bit Beyond, in 3 LAW: A CENTURY OF
PROGRESS 80, 85 (1937).
105. LIFE AND LAW, supra note 1, at 311.
106. Sometimes exceptions became omissions. Life insurance cases had developed a
substantial jurisprudence establishing that coverage became effective before the formal
acceptance. See Edwin W. Patterson, The Delivery of a Life-Insurance Policy, 33 HARV. L.
REv. 198, 207-08 (1919). Most of the cases establishing this divergent rule, however, did
not find their way into the treatise. See Cook, supra note 100, at 514.
107. Corbin noted the "noble effort" Willisten made to defend consideration, but
concluded: "[Tihe complexity of the result and that the many admissions that conflict ex-
ist and certain very large classes of cases must be regarded as 'exceptional' indicate that
in many twilight zones the courts must trust to instinct rather than to definition or
'theory' or 'established principle.'" Corbin, supra note 102, at 944.
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eth-century contract law. In drafting the Restatement, Williston
joined Corbin in vigorously insisting that promissory estoppel be in-
cluded as a ground for enforcing promises. He was just as insistent,
however, that this rationale be set aside in its own pigeonhole,
which became Section 90. He did not want it included as some vari-
ant species of consideration, fearing that this might sully the defini-
tion of bargain consideration, which was meanwhile preserved sac-
rosanct in Section 75. Ironically, this fostered the acceptance of
promissory estoppel; given its own territory, the doctrine flour-
ished.0
Such thinking places Williston within the formalist tradition-
inextricably, perhaps, but not irredeemably. It is misleading, how-
ever, to view his implicit belief in simplicity, structure, and certainty
as a commitment to the politics behind formalism, or as a conscious
rejection of importing social concerns into the law. In later years, he
would voice doubts about the New Deal, but these seem to have been
the remarks of any very old man about very new innovations. 10 9 In
an age when anti-Semitism characterized much of American life,
social and academic, he befriended Felix Frankfurter-who repaid
him with worshipful respect-and seems to have been a professor
whom other Jewish students sought out.10 His own discussion of
"liberty of contract" is surprisingly positivist in tone: he blandly dis-
cussed the factors which had led to the theory's rise, identified it
with the generation preceding his own, noted its apex in Lochner,
then noted its decline."' Where Holmes saw change in terms of
monumental shifts, viewing it through a poet's eye, Williston re-
corded change with the matter-of-factness of a treatise-writer. He
was, however, equally open to accepting it.
108. The phrase "promissory estoppel" apparently was coined by Williston. See
Benjamin F. Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Requirements and Limitations of the Doctrine,
98 U. PA. L. REV. 459, 459 (1950); Daniel J. Klau, Note, What Price Certainty? Corbin,
Williston, and the Restatement of Contracts, 70 B.U. L. REV. 511, 534 (1990). Section 90
was a careful piece of clarification by Willisten. In the treatise, he originally had
discussed promissory estoppel as a substitute, rather than an alternative, to bargain
consideration. See LAW OF CONTRACTS, supra note 63, § 139.
109. See, e.g., LIFE AND LAW, supra note 1, at 334-35. Williston wrote: "Like most old
men, I dislike the present outlook .... One who has believed in the theories of Emerson
and Franklin cannot fail to be troubled by confirmed deficit spending and centralized bu-
reaucratic, paternalistic regimentation." Id.
110. See Felix Frankfurter, Samuel Williston: An Inadequate Tribute to a Beloved
Teacher, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1321 (1963); Jacob J. Kaplan, Mr. Justice Brandeis, Prophet,
NEW PALESTINIAN, Nov. 14, 1942, at 27, cited in PHILIPPA STRUMi, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS:
JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE 32 (1984) (recalling that when Kaplan sought advice from Wil-
listen on whether he should take a position with Brandeis's law firm, Williston com-
mended the firm and said that he had gone there himself when he needed counsel).
111. Freedom of Contract, supra note 98 (discussing, inter alia, Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S 45 (1905)).
[Vol. 42
1994] SAMUEL WILLISTON 29
B. Williston and Sociological Jurisprudence
In 1908, at the annual meeting of the Association of American
Law Schools, Williston delivered an address titled The Necessity of
Idealism in Teaching Law. His opening sentence made clear his
overall posture: "By idealism in teaching law I mean aiming to teach
the law as it ought to be rather than simply as it is."" 2 Williston
elaborated:
[The teacher of law] must keep his own mind and that of his students con-
stantly addressed to the general rule, free from arbitrary exceptions, and
must use particular cases to bring the rule out, rather than emphasize the
importance of inconsistencies and peculiarities. For the ideal of the law is
towards a few general principles, while in practice, with the increasing
complexity of human affairs, the number of minor rules and applications
is always increasing....
... Nearly every one will agree that some attention should be given to
the law as it ought to be. Few will deny that the law as it is must receive
some attention, even when it is not what it ought to be; but I believe that
there is little danger of erring on the side of overemphasis of the theoreti-
cally right rule.'
13
So far, this was unexceptionably formalistic. But then, at its conclu-
sion, the address sounded a note of veiled and diplomatic sarcasm.
We cannot all, like Blackstone, find a reason for the perfection of existing
rules, so that the burning of female murderers, instead of hanging them,
becomes right because of the decency due to the sex, and the allowance of
ten days for appearance after the return day of a writ becomes logical, be-
cause it is beneath the dignity of a free man to do anything exactly when
he is told to do it."
4
These were not the insights upon which a formalist would insist.
These were the words of a jurisprudent who saw how formalism
served to invent excuses for the status quo.
To speak of free men, with a sarcastic edge in one's voice, re-
called how seldom men were really free. To scoff at Blackstone's
claim that the law respected freedom and dignity was also to scoff at
liberty-of-contract doctrine; decisions like Lochner also claimed to
uphold freedom and dignity. To deride one assertion cast doubt on
the other. And Williston saw how little women had gained from the
law's supposed solicitude-was it a privilege to be burned to death?
112. Samuel Williston, The Necessity of Idealism in Teaching Law, Address Before
the Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools and the Section of Legal Educa-
tion of the American Bar Association (August 25, 1908), in 2 Am. L. SCH. REV. 201, 201
(1906-11).
113. Id. at 201-03.
114. Id. at 203.
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Within the well-turned phrases, there lurked a piquant black hu-
mor-which means, an articulate awareness of the gulf between is
and ought."
5
This awareness is common in Williston's writing. It may be re-
flected most clearly, perhaps, in Some Modern Tendencies in the
Law, a series of lectures published in 1929, which represent his
longest sustained discussion of jurisprudence. The aphorisms and
generalizations found in this work reveal a stabilizing self-aware-
ness and a healthy distrust of pure theory:
Law has been variously defined... but for the purpose of the present dis-
cussion it consists of rules of conduct conformity with which society
through some governmental agency enforces, or non-conformity with
which it penalizes."
6
In the formation of the English law that we inherit it has been only a
section of the people and, until recently, not a very large section that has
had a hand in the work....
.. The English law of distress which allowed a landlord to seize for
rent any goods on the leased premises, whether belonging to the tenant or
anyone else, would hardly have been developed had not the landowners
rather than tenants, settled the rule and made that customary which was,
it must be presumed, always obnoxious to most of the community."
7
Courts are unwilling to admit that they manufacture new law .... 11
A rule of law is but a prophecy of what the courts will decide, and it is
plain that courts should and will so far as the traditional limits of the ju-
dicial functions permit endeavor to conform the law to changing social
conditions.
119
There is something about the practice of the law that breeds not merely a
contentment with things as they are, but a belief that law cannot be oth-
erwise administered. 20
In some parts of the law doubtless deductive logic plays little part; but in
115. Williston's sarcasm was subtle. Felix Frankfurter wrote that his old teacher
possessed "that delicacy of touch and refimement of innuendo in phrasing that character-
ize a great musical artist." Frankfurter, supra note 110, at 1322. In 1938, when Harvard
University sent Williston a letter-a letter sent to all faculty who had reached the age of
seventy-five-stating that his resignation had been graciously accepted, Williston
"stormed" into the university president's office and angrily exclaimed that his resignation
could not be accepted because it had not been offered. DICTIONARY OF AIdERIcAN Bi-
OGRAPHY 792 (Supp. 7, 1981). Yet in Life and Law, Williston spoke only of this incident as
"a wise rule of the Harvard Corporation" which had prevented him "from lingering longer
in the lap of [his] alma mater." LIFE AND LAW, supra note 1, at 333.
116. MODERN TENDENCIES, supra note 86, at 8.
117. Id. at 11-12.
118. Id. at 82.
119. Id. at 142.
120. Id. at 149.
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others it plays a large part. Yet it is seldom "remorseless."...
Logic supplies a probability but it is not remorseless.
121
Drawing on Holmes was not atypical. An examination of the sources
Williston cited in Some Modern Tendencies in the Law reveals three
citations to Holmes and two to Roscoe Pound. There is one to Wesley
Hohfeld, one to John Maynard Keynes' Treatise on Probability, and
six to Public Policy in the English Common Law, by Percy Winfield,
an article which drew progressive insights from legal history.12  But
by far the most common citations, at least thirteen, are to the works
of Benjamin Cardozo. The source upon whom Williston preferred to
rely was one of the greatest and most adeptly progressive of judges.
This social awareness, this desire to involve legal analysis with
fact and practice, is not merely a counterpoint to Williston's empha-
sis on principle; rather, the two are harmonics of the same chord.
123
For Williston, "principle" was not what it had been for Langdell.
Langdell had been one to follow logic inexorably. 24 Williston, by
contrast, preferred to treat "principle" more as a generalized con-
clusion than as a premise.
[W]hat I have been saying may be summarized more simply by an adop-
tion of the illustration of Socrates. If we can say, almost all men are mor-
tal, though occasionally one may be found who is not, the judicial conclu-
sion in a particular case is likely to be that Socrates is mortal unless it can
be shown that there are some peculiar circumstances in the facts of his
case rendering the rule that applies to most men inapplicable to him. A
great deal of legal and judicial reasoning is like that. Logic supplies a
probability but it is not remorseless. Presumptions and probabilities have
their importance in the determination of the application of a rule of law as
well as in determining a disputed issue of fact.
125
121. Id. at 154-57.
122. Percy H. Winfield, Public Policy in the History of the Common Law, 42 HARV.
L. REV. 76 (1929).
123. Felix Cohen used this awareness as an excuse to criticize Williston for ambiva-
lence and vacillation:
[T]he discussions of a Williston will oscillate between a theory of what courts ac-
tually do and a theory of what courts ought to do, without coming to rest either
on the plane of social actualities or on the plane of values long enough to come
to grips with significant problems. This confused wandering between the world
of fact and the world ofjustice vitiates every argument and every analysis.
Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUAT. L.
REV. 809, 841 (1935).
124. At one point, Langdell had argued for reversal of the mailbox rule, then estab-
lished and accepted throughout the common-law world, on the grounds that consideration
theory demanded its reversal. See Grey, supra note 65, at 4.
125. MODERN TENDENCIES, supra note 86, at 156-57. This assertion is supported
with a citation to Keynes, whom Williston knew through Cardozo's work. Id. at 157 n.2.
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To follow principle, as Williston used the term, meant to seek
"logical coherence" and "logical coordination" across the law. It
meant to draw useful analogies.12 It meant to achieve harmony and
congruence where feasible, rather than maintain differences based
on the traditional division between law and equity or the medieval
forms of actions. In its purest form, it was insight.
It is the mark of a great scientist that he can correlate [scientific] facts
and deduce a general law. In the same way he is not a great lawyer who
knows the rule that is applicable to a large number of special situations. It
is the capacity to generalize and to see relations between the rules govern-
ing particular states of fact, which mark the great lawyer. As a great law-
yer has said: "The mark of a master is, that facts which before lay scat-
tered in an inorganic mass, when he shoots through them the magnetic
current of his thought, leap into an organic order, and live and bear
fruit."
27
Yet while Williston believed in working from fact, he described
the result in terms of abstractions.'28 Aware of the myriad promises
which courts had enforced, aware of the myriad justifications courts
had found sufficient for enforcing them, Williston nonetheless
sought to express enforceability in terms of a single general func-
tion. He had litigated commercial cases and drafted uniform com-
mercial statutes, acquiring thereby first-hand experience with how
business law and business conduct intersected. Nevertheless, even
here he could not conceive the law in terms of interaction, in terms
of tension, fluidity, and process. He described law in terms of prin-
ciple-guidelines in which the provisional would only slightly tem-
per the eternal. (So to speak, his perspective was Newtonian rather
than Heisenbergian.) Fully cognizant of the law's shortcomings, he
became a codifier rather than a revolutionary. The question of Wil-
liston's story, ultimately, is understanding why a man who saw so
clearly the realities with which law must deal described those reali-
ties so formally.
126. For example, Williston treated conditional sales as if they were mortgages, as
the Uniform Code would do. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-302 (1984); U.C.O. § 9-401 cmts. (1984);
MODERN TENDENCIES, supra note 86, at 41-45.
127. MODERN TENDENCIES, supra note 86, at 123-24. The great lawyer quoted is
Holmes.
128. Willard Hurst has commented that Williston "was a most courtly, benign figure
(a type of style not then or later conspicuous at [Harvard] Law School). His teaching was
almost like basic geometry or physics/1930's type. In retrospect I've wondered that a man
as immersed as he was in working details of marketplace dealings should have let almost
nothing of this creep into his classroom presentations." Letter from William Hurst to Al-
len Boyer (Nov. 23, 1992) (on file with the Buffalo Law Review).
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C. Methodology and Psychology
Jerome Frank once quipped that a case's outcome depended on
what the judge had eaten for breakfast. 9 If this criticism has value,
it is in suggesting that analytical methodology is a function of per-
sonal psychology. A jurist's customary manner of addressing issues
may relate to his or her individual temperament and experience-
that is, to psychological factors.
The work of writers and philosophers, even of scientists, has
been usefully analyzed from the psychological vantage point.30 More
recently, such consideration has been applied to legal thinkers-in
particular, to Justice Holmes.' 3 ' And to relate work to psychology is
amply warranted in the case of Williston, who described himself as a
hypersensitive with an inferiority complex.
The best explanation for Williston's formalism may be psycho-
logical. The focus should not be on the self-control that Williston
lost, but on the self-control he managed to regain. Ultimately, it is
less important that Williston broke down than that he recovered,
and that he worked himself through to recovery. It is less important
that he dosed himself with sedatives than that he insisted on retain-
ing personal control of the drugs which were administered to him.
The process through which he reasserted control over his own life
left its stamp on Williston's presentation of law.
13 2
129. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORIATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960,
at 176 (1992).
130. See, e.g., HAROLD BLOOM, THE ANXIETY OF INFLUENCE: A THEORY OF POETRY
(1973) (depicting literary tradition as Oedipal conflict between generations of poets);
FRANK E. MANUEL, A PORTRAIT OF ISAAC NEWTON (1968) (presenting a Freudian study);
JAIES MILLER, THE PASSION OF MICHEL FOUCAULT (1993) (contending that philosopher's
work is defined by preoccupation with death).
131. See, e.g., Michael H. Hoffheimer, Justice Holmes: Law and the Search for Con-
trol 1989 Y.B. SUP. CT. HIST. SOC'Y 98, 100-05 (explaining Holmes' conflict with his father
through the use of a psychoanalytic approach); Saul Touster, In Search of Holmes from
Within, 18 VAND. L. REV. 436 (1965) (analyzing Holmes' Civil War experience). Recently,
it has been suggested that Holmes reached the analytic boldness and expressive power of
The Path of the Law because Holmes composed this address during a rare moment of be-
ing happy in love. See HORWITz, supra note 129, at 142-43; Daniel J. Kornstein, Justice
Holmes in Love, 64 N.Y. ST. B.J., July-Aug. 1992, at 10-13.
132. Ignorance or denial of Williston's psychological struggle has limited apprecia-
tion of this influence on his work. The tension is illustrated by a marginal comment made
by Judge Charles Wyzanski in his copy of Life and Law: "L.H. [Learned Hand] wrongly
thought S.W. [Samuel Williston] devoted too much space to his illness." LIFE AND LAW,
supra note 1, at 142 (Judge Charles Wyzanski's copy of Life and Law, on file with the
author). Williston's personal history is highly relevant to understanding his preference for
order and stability; without it, political ties or aesthetic choices have seemed the most
likely explanations for his order-driven jurisprudence.
A discreet silence concerning Williston's breakdowns played a part in this. The offi-
cial history of Harvard Law School, for example, noted only that two lecturers "took some
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Williston's fondness for billiards is more than a metaphor for
his formalist tendencies. Psychologically, play is an important and
revealing activity.'33 Playing games helps the player master situ-
ations in which stimuli have become overwhelming. It may allow an
outlet for wish-fulfillment.' Anna Freud suggested that play is part
of a developmental process which leads to and ends in work.
Through play, the individual acquires control over his or her im-
pulses and reactions, and the ability to sublimate internal pressures
and work toward goals.'
Against this background, Williston's fondness for billiards re-
veals a preference for precision and certainty. It reveals a compel-
ling personal need for regularity and order. Billiards may be the
most geometric of pastimes. The game can be described in terms of
lines and points. It scatters spheres randomly across a plane, and
vectors them off the sides of a rectangle. Built around the careful
measurement of angles and the accurate balancing of velocity
against inertia, it is a pastime for thinkers. To play billiards well is
to have mastered, within the table's limits, the principles of Newto-
nian physics. Overall, the game is about the shattering and restora-
tion of order. For a man who had been incapacitated, billiards of-
fered a realm he could control.
36
Williston was an insomniac who could give up sedatives and go
of Professor Williston's courses during his illness" and that "the condition of his health"
compelled Williston to decline the deanship in 1910. CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE
HARVARD LAW SCHOOL 52, 58 (1918).
Reviewers of Life and Law were often less frank in discussing Williston's "nervous
exhaustion" than Williston had been in describing it. Roscoe Pound spoke obliquely of
Williston as one "who by steady perseverance in spite of much ill health and recurrent
break downs, achieved far more than the more physically robust of his generation," with a
"serene common sense" which "held him above depression under repeated cause to be de-
pressed." Roscoe Pound, Book Review, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 566, 569 (1941) (reviewing
SAMUEL WILLISTON, LIFE AND LAW (1941)). As recently as 1987, the psychological nature
of Williston's difficulties was cautiously avoided. Allan Farnsworth wrote: "Williston, who
had been plagued by illness [in the first years of the century], had a dramatic improve-
ment in his health in 1912." E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts Scholarship in the Age of the
Anthology, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1406, 1424 n.103 (1987). The turning point mentioned by
.Farnsworth was Williston's discovery ofveronal.
133. See, e.g., Eric A. Plaut, Play and Adaptation, 34 PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY OF
THE CHILD 217 (1979).
134. Robert Walder, The Psychoanalytic Theory of Play, 2 PSYCHOANALYTIC Q. 208
(1933).
135. ANNA FREUD, NORMALITY AND PATHOLOGY IN CHILDHOOD: ASSESSMENTS OF
DEVELOPMENT (2d ed. 1980).
136. A revealing parallel comes from the history of mathematics, a discipline which,
like law, accords the solidity of concrete objects to imaginary constructs and postulated
relationships. Blaise Pascal, suffering from chronic depression and physical pain, found
himself free of these discontents when he thought about the cycloid curve. STUART
HOLLINGDALE, MAKERS OF MATHEMATICS 154-55 (1989).
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to sleep naturally once he learned that an effective drug was avail-
able. Knowing that the remedy existed was enough; he did not ac-
tually have to take it. In this respect, he showed himself to be the
same man who thought it good that open issues be anticipated by
the promulgation of rules. In both cases, he felt (or found) that pro-
viding for a solution effectively remedied the problem. Related to
this was his implicit belief in simplicity and structure, his belief that
language could be made error-proof and that all enforceable agree-
ments could be modeled on the simplest. This equated pattern and
structure with coherence and meaning.
Duncan Kennedy has addressed the way in which legal meth-
odologies, raised to the level of systems, mediate societal and intel-
lectual tensions.
One of the functions of systems of legal thought-one of the reasons for
their existence-is the reconciliation of what appear to be conflicts be-
tween institutions and contradictions among ideas. In other words, system
is necessary not just to permit us to deal in a cognitively effective way
with the chaotic mass of rules. It is also necessary because the theorist
wishes to show that where many perceive confusion, danger, insecurity,
rivalry, and aggressive action, there exists a latent order that has a le-
gitimate claim to our respect. This order, once recognized, is both a reas-
suring fact and a goal for constructive striving.
137
This speaks directly to the psychological comfort Williston found in
the strictures of formalist thinking.
Williston's desire for certainty transparently responded to the
insecurity he had felt in youth. At Clifton Springs, he had found that
any tension aggravated his symptoms. It is easy to recognize par-
ticular ways in which he sought the emotional reinforcement of
stability in life and work. He chose to stay at Harvard, despite dis-
satisfaction with his salary and offers of higher-paying jobs else-
where, because his emotional capital was invested in the institution.
As his intellectual home, Harvard was a valuable refuge: the law
school was the first place where he had shown any particular ac-
complishment. By remaining there, Williston avoided the tension
and uncertainty of change.3 8 Similarly, in assigning to law the role
of avoiding disputes, as well as settling them, Williston gave a high
priority to preventing conflict-avoiding tension. This transposed
137. Kennedy, Historical Understanding, supra note 66, at 9.
138. Williston's home life supports this suggestion. The Williston family lived in a
rented house, decade after decade, installing two furnaces, electric lights, an electric
stove, and other improvements: "Hardwood floors and two additional bathrooms complete
the list of major improvements that I was glad to make on a house that I did not own."
LIFE AND LAW, supra note 1, at 168. Apparently, renting from year to year provided envi-




his psychological concerns into the legal realm.
Most notably, Williston's preference for analyzing law as a
matter of rule and exception also offered a means of minimizing
tension. So to speak, in explaining why agreements were enforced,
oftentimes the law said both-and. Bargain consideration was one
reason to enforce a promise, but other reasons would do. Thinking in
terms of rule and exception let Williston declare that the law actu-
ally said either-or. It let him state the issue as a clear-cut choice.
Either there was bargain consideration, and an enforceable contract,
or there was not-although of course the courts might nonetheless
find a different reason for enforcing the agreement.
Phrasing enforceability as an either-or question let Williston
present this issue as a clear-cut choice. Choices which seem clear-cut
are the easiest to justify. Where there seems to be no ambiguity, it is
harder to be ambivalent. This means less tension, less friction in the
decision-making process. Where the contrast between alternatives
seems sharp, the person who makes the decision appears to exercise
less personal responsibility for the choice and thereby experiences
less tension in making it. Rationales and excuses are readily at
hand. In the circumstances, there was only one solution. As it was
put, the question answered itself.139
Crucial to Wiliston's personal psychology was an insistence on
personal autonomy. Where most neurasthenics submitted entirely to
having their lives and therapies controlled by doctors, he controlled
his own medication. 4 ' The other side of this was a deep-seated fear
of being out of control, a fear of formlessness-the despair he had
felt during his breakdown in 1899.
This pattern, too, is reflected in Williston's jurisprudence. To
insist that doctrine controls the law means rejecting the very defen-
sible hypothesis that law is a relatively unstructured constellation of
single decisions by individual judges.'4' To believe in objectivity is to
139. Again, the mathematical parallel is helpful. Isaac Newton hated tension and
controversy;, his first nervous breakdown had been preceded by an epistolary disputation
with a group of English Jesuits. An "abnormal dread" of controversy was the other side of
his elegant proofs and precise intuitions. To avoid such tensions, he went so far as to con-
ceal his authorship of some early mathematical papers and to withhold some others from
publication. E.N. da Costa, Isaac Newton, in 1 THE WORLD OF MATHEMATICS 255, 270-71
(James R. Newman ed., 1956).
140. At the Riggs Clinic, they gave Williston placebos. This he resented: "I have
never quite forgiven the deceit involved in giving me a capsule with no sedative ... "
LIFE AND LAW, supra note 1, at 165.
141. Williston spoke of "the preference that men have to be subjected rather to what
seems an inanimate rule than to the unbridled will of one of their fellow creatures.... "
MODERN TENDENCIES, supra note 86, at 2. He added that "[slubmission to the unre-
strained personal opinion of arbitrators is not likely to become a generally popular
method of settling all classes of disputes." Id. at 57.
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insist that there are external, verifiable truths. To insist that rules
apply is a way of denying chaos.
VI. WILLISTON AND "WILLISTON"
Williston's treatise on contracts was immediately recognized as
a classic text. It was also immediately recognized as the order. Not
only did it encapsulate the existing law; new schools of thought
would also test themselves by rebelling against it. As a landmark, it
retains much of its original eminence. Rare would be the review of a
new text on contracts that did not invoke its name, making it an ex-
emplar for either comparison or contrast.
142
Practically speaking, the treatise revolutionized business law.
It may even be said to have defined it. It has been suggested that
the Uniform Sales Act, which Williston drafted, cannot be effectively
employed without reference to the treatise. Because it comple-
mented the statute so fully, it was considered to be of equal stat-
ure.
143
Equally remarkable was the transformation which the treatise
wrought in Williston's own life. When he died in 1963, at the age of
101, he received the signal tribute of an article in Time magazine.
Under the headline "A Yankee Socrates," his reputation was immor-
talized:
The titles of his fat, cloth-covered tomes would hardly thrill a random
bookstore browser. But in a lawyer's den or a judge's chambers, the four
volumes of Williston on Sales or the nine volumes of Williston on Contracts
never gather dust....
Legend holds that Williston was the last Harvard professor to wear a
142. See, e.g., Friedrich Kessler, Book Review, 61 YALE L.J. 1092, 1092 (1952)
(reviewing ARTHUR L. CORBIN, A COMPREHENSIVE TREATISE ON THE RULES OF CONTRACT
LAW (1950)).
143. Grant Gilmore wrote:
Statutes like the Uniform Sales Act were not statutes at all. That is, they
were not designed to provide rules for decision. Drafted in terms of loose and
vague generality, they were designed to provide access to the prevailing aca-
demic wisdom. The rules for decision in sales cases were to be found, not in the
Uniform Sales Act which had been drafted by Samuel Williston of the Harvard
Law School, but in Professor Williston's treatise on the law of sales. This aspect
of the codification was, apparently, generally understood. The courts-and
counsel-paid no attention at all to the Sales Act; they paid enormous attention
to Professor Williston's treatise.
GILmoRE, supra note 3, at 71-72 (citation omitted).
At least one court confused the two, mistakenly citing to the treatise when it in-
tended to cite the Restatement. See Port Huron Mach. Co. v. Wohlers, 221 N.W. 843, 844
(Iowa 1928) (citing § 139 of Williston's treatise rather than § 90 of the Restatement of
Contracts), cited in Hildebrand, supra note 95, at 319-20.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
starched wing collar while lecturing, but his delivery was folksy, drawing
on imagery that enlivened dull debates on commercial law. He would be-
gin in his Yankee twang, "Il trade my horse Dobbin for your minced pie,"
and his rapt listeners would be carried off on another excursion into the
law that was more social science than cold cases....
On Williston's retirement from Harvard in 1938, his students gave the
dean of U.S. law education a silver bowl. It was inscribed, In consideration
of natural love and affection. White-thatched Williston, who always knew
when a contract was binding, replied with gentle legal wit, "The feeling is
mutual, so that makes it bilateral."144
None of this would have seemed likely in 1901. Williston noted the
inauspicious circumstances in which he had begun the century: "I
found myself, after my illness, when about forty years of age, in debt
for $2,000 and with no assets except a little life insurance and two
not very profitable casebooks."14 He lived in a rented house in a
distant suburb, so far from his native Cambridge that he and his
family relied on a windmill for water and spent their evenings by
the light of kerosene lamps. Repairs and renovations would consume
his spare capital for years to come. His family had struggled for
years on half-pay. He had never brought in a substantial legal fee;
after fifteen years, Mary Williston was still waiting for her engage-
ment ring.1
Writing on sales and contracts brought Williston out of this
slough. As the demands upon him grew, a new energy and industri-
ousness emerged to meet them. Beginning in 1902, he was at work
on several projects of law reform-most notably, the Uniform Sales
Act, the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act, and Pomerene Bill. 147 He
resumed publishing in the law journals, working toward his treatise
on Sales and then his treatise on Contracts. It was during these
years that he thought he worked better than at any time since his
breakdown. Writing became routine. He hired a secretary, who took
dictation and pored over his longhand drafts for the next thirty
years.
48
144. A Yankee Socrates, TmIE, Mar. 1, 1963, at 65.
145. LIFE AND LAW, supra note 1, at 272.
146. She finally received the engagement ring in the summer of 1903, when her
husband's work on an appellate brief netted him a $3,000 fee. See id. In the following
years, royalties from the treatise and Williston's other publications provided an increas-
ingly solid financial foundation. Despite stock-market losses during the Depression, Wil-
listen was nonetheless able to afford to remodel the house he and his sister Emily occu-
pied in his last years, making alterations which included installing an elevator. Id. at
330.
147. Id. at 217-29.
148. Id. at 262. There were some drawbacks to this industry. Williston developed a
phobia of unorganized cases. He periodically counted up the number of volumes which
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[M]y habits of work, though not involving long daily hours were regular
and persistent. During the thirty-three years that I lived in Belmont I did
not often go out in the evening; I worked not only six days in the week,
but, rightly or wrongly, also on Sunday. In summer vacations, except
when actually travelling, I usually was able to take some material with
me on which I would work for a part of each day.
149
His breakdowns came now when he was not working, when he ven-
tured outside the weekly cycle of class schedules and daily writing.
His 1903 collapse took place at the end of the spring semester; he
managed to get over it in time for the fall term. The breakdowns of
1923 and 1924 were also confined to the summer months.
It is not known how consciously Williston identified his work in
bringing order to contract law with the task of restoring order in his
personal life. He had some psychological training; the extent re-
mains vague. 10 He had heard of the inferiority complex; he never
said whether he had heard of compensation, the complementary
idea that someone who feels inferior in one area of life may offset
this with achievement in another. It can be certain, however, that
the process of completing the treatise re-established Williston's
control of his inner life, and that a man who had been badly battered
by chronic depression stabilized himself by rigorously working out a
vision of law which was remarkable for its insistence on order and
principle.
VII. WILUSTON, PARSONS, AND THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
If completing the treatise established Williston as a scholar in
his own right, it also established his independence of earlier juris-
prudents. He identified his work with a new regime of contract law.
Williston's The Law of Contracts was everything that his earlier
book-length study of contract law, his 1893 edition of Theophilus
Parsons' The Law of Contracts, had not been. He was proud to claim
had to be searched and cases which had to be accounted for.
For the purpose of showing the bulk of the existing sources of the common law, I
have had a rough count made of American law reports existing in 1939. I have
also had a count made of the volumes containing the American case law at
about the end of the years 1928, 1914, and 1885....
I find that there were in the year 1939 about 14,000 American law reports.
At the end of 1928 there were slightly more than 11,000. At the end of 1914,
there were about 8,600. At the end of 1885, there were slightly more than 3,500.
Id. at 307-08.
149. Id. at 303.
150. At the Riggs Clinic, patients received some basic orientation to psychology. Id.
at 165. Apparently this was imparted through pamphlets and twice-weekly lectures. See
KUBIE, supra note 35, at 27-29.
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his treatise as his own work, but this was hardly true of the earlier
book.
[M]y hope of making [Parsons'] book of much value to legal scholarship
was doomed to disappointment.... [Tihe author had aimed to make the
book so inclusive that it professed to cover a field impossible to deal with
satisfactorily within the permitted space. There was even a chapter on
contributory negligence, a topic hardly appropriate for a treatise on con-
tracts.... Finally much of the text was never of the first quality and in
many places was completely antiquated. But the book had been quoted
and used by courts and lawyers for so many years that an editor was not
expected to tamper with the text. If he did so in order to correct a positive
error, his insertion must be put in brackets. The notes of previous editors
also already overloaded the book....
... The edition was published in 1893. 1 have no pride in it, though I do
not think my work was discreditable when the nature of Parsons' book is
considered.151
This passage suggests a close connection between Williston's need
for control, his belief in principle as "logical coordination," and the
therapy he had found in scholarship. Revising Parsons-or, rather,
being unable to revise Parsons-had meant frustration. He had been
forced to accommodate other people's failings. Two decades later,
after his recovery, working on his own, he had defined a law of con-
tracts, sorting and organizing cases until such logical coordination
had built up three volumes' worth of manuscript. Williston's The
Law of Contracts was as different from the eighth edition of Parsons'
The Law of Contracts as the academic mandarin of 1925 was from
the harried assistant professor of 1893.
The scorn Williston felt for Parsons' treatise-and, perhaps, for
his own acquiescence in its shortcomings-was the same scorn he
had shown toward Blackstone's apologias for the senseless. The
same tone was heard in his dismissal of what law had been in
Blackstone and Parsons' day, before it was organized along lines of
principle.
It is not only a function of the law to make a just determination of liti-
gated controversies, but quite as important a function is to provide rules
of action which may be relied upon without litigation. While the law is un-
certain, this latter function cannot be performed ....
Complexity of law is opposed to simplicity. Broad general rules are
simple. Where distinctions and exceptions are numerous, even if the dis-
tinctions are well settled, the law is complex. If the distinctions and ex-
ceptions are founded on unsubstantial grounds, the complexity is unnec-
151. LIFE AND LAW, supra note 1, at 137. Commentary indicates that the book was
just as unsuccessful as Williston suggested. See Book Note, 3 YALE L.J. 105 (1893)
(reviewing THEOPHILUS PARSONS, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1893)) (criticizing the work for




... [C]omplexity is always accompanied by uncertainty. Wherever
there are numerous lines of distinction it becomes increasingly plausible
to argue that the case at bar falls on one side or the other of some of the
lines. Law tends to become a game in which logomachy plays too great a
part.
5 2
Williston quoted Tennyson to describe the former regime of law:
The lawless science of our law,
The codeless myriad of precedent
That wilderness of single instances.1
5 3
The wilderness of single instances, for Williston, had been the
era before 1870, when Langdell replaced Parsons at the helm of
Harvard Law School. In Parsons' day, Williston wrote:
[L]aw was taught from treatises and from lectures. The authors of the
treatises and the lecturers gained their knowledge from the reported de-
cisions of the courts. The knowledge thus acquired was retailed at second
hand to the students. There was little disposition to question the validity
of precedents or to compare the logical consistency of decisions in one
category with decisions in other categories.15
To follow the cases was not to follow principle; forcing the shift from
one rule to another had been the essence of the Langdellian revolu-
tion. Williston saw a great gulf fixed between stare decisis and stare
principiis. Before principle had been chaos. The haphazard sprawl of
Parsons' treatise, which preserved the old precedents decade after
decade, went with the Blackstonian rationalization of the legal
status quo. The tangle of senseless rules grew out of the chaotic
jumble of precedents.'55
152. MODERN TENDENCIES, supra note 86, at 95-96.
153. Id. at 7 (citation omitted).
154. LIFE AND LAW, supra note 1, at 198.
155. Scholarship confirms Williston's views of what Harvard Law School had been
under Parsons. Classes appear to have been ill-attended and dull, with one student writ-
ing in his journal "at this point Parsons [became] Pathetic," and then ceasing to take
notes. WILLIAM P. LAPIANA, LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE: AMERICAN LEGAL EDUCATION 1800-
1920 (forthcoming 1993) (manuscript at 122, on file with author) (citation omitted). The
atmosphere "was still charged with the complacent optimism of Sir William Blackstone
and the other 'venerable sages of the law.'" Id. at 123 (citation omitted).
Allan Farnsworth has noted:
The early American treatise writers were heavily influenced by their fascination
with the particular and gave little attention to matters of organization. Thus a
reader of the 1853 edition of Parsons encountered twenty-two chapters on
"Parties to a Contract," including "Outlaws, Persons Attainted, and Persons Ex-
communicated," before coming upon "Consideration and Assent."
Farnsworth, supra note 132, at 1435. This structure was scrupulously preserved in the
1893 edition and even Williston, in organizing his treatise, was subjected to the structure
imposed by his predecessors.
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Such connections open an intricate complex of psychological
rhymes. One pattern connects the shapelessness of what law had
been to the rambling inclusiveness of Parsons' treatise-a disap-
pointment. Williston had gone through in the tension before his
breakdown. Another pattern brings together form and principle (the
coherence Williston saw in the law of his own generation) with Wil-
liston's Contracts treatise (which had used such principles to
achieve such coherence) and these with the stability Williston had
regained in completing the treatise. When Tennyson paired the
"codeless myriad of precedent" with the metaphor of wilderness, he
connected legal randomness and jumble with emptiness and desola-
tion. In repeating the lines, Williston reiterated this connection. But
the phrase also alluded to another myriad of precedents, the vast
volume of decisions which Williston had marshalled and explicated.
To speak of "Williston on Contracts" has been to refer to both
the author and the text. That the same reference comprehends man
and book reflects the process and structure that had given each
identity.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Octavio Paz, the Mexican essayist and Nobel laureate, has de-
scribed what he calls the tradition of rupture.156 There have often
been great differences between various literary generations, Paz has
observed-for example, between pastoral poets and writers who pro-
claimed themselves first among the avant-garde. But even though
the avant-gardists had no intention themselves of writing in meas-
ured cadences about country life, they had studied their predeces-
sors and learned from them. There was a continuity one could trace,
even if its course was marked by sharp, free-wheeling changes of di-
rection.
Paz spoke of literature, but his insight holds true for other dis-
ciplines. It describes the way in which new work responds to work
which has been done before. Something of this sort can traced out
even in the history of commercial law. When Karl Llewellyn pub-
lished his Cases and Materials on the Law of Sales, Williston shared
the honors of its dedication. 67 Arthur Corbin hailed Williston
warmly as his older brother in the law, and praised his leadership of
the Restatement working committee; it had been Williston who
156. See, e.g., OCTAVIO PAZ, LOS HIJOS DEL LIMO 15 (1974).
157. KARL LLEWELLYN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF SALES (1930); see also
WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 406 (1973); Karl
Llewellyn, Book Review, 16 A.B.A. J. 809, 810 (1930) (reviewing SAMUEL WILLISTON,
SOME MODERN TENDENCIES IN THE LAW (1929)) (describing the work as "a master's book
[which] maintains the master's standard").
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brought him into the project. 58
If the new generation of commercial lawyers appeared to break
with Williston, part of the reason was that Williston held back from
joining them. In 1929, when he quoted Tennyson in Some Modern
Tendencies in the Law, the wilderness of single instances was clearly
meant to refer to the past-to the legal jumble Parsons had amassed
and Blackstone had rationalized. By 1941, however, when Williston
quoted Tennyson again in Life and Law, the wilderness of single
instances was something to be feared from the future.
Philosophically, Williston's jurisprudence took an idealist per-
spective. It sought out the similarities in different forms and kinds
of agreements. Karl Llewellyn, by contrast, took a decidedly nomi-
nalist tack. Williston had aspired to broad general rules; Llewellyn
advocated "narrow issue thinking." Llewellyn rejected the idea that
all contracts could be treated alike.
Transactions between professionals (or merchants) should be treated dif-
ferently from transactions in which a professional sold goods to a non-pro-
fessional (or consumer). Sales for resale should be treated differently from
sales for use. Distinctions should be made between sales for cash and
sales on credit; present sales and future sales; one-shot or single delivery
transactions and long-term contract arrangements. 159
Williston regarded narrow issue thinking as his missionary
grandfather might have regarded a revival of paganism. He saw it
as a recrudescence of pre-Langdellian chaos. He viewed Legal Real-
ism as the leading edge of "the so-called functional approach," which
sought to achieve the best possible result in each individual case, re-
.gardless of precedent.6 ' IN]arrowing categories always involve a
loss [of clarity] because of increased complexity," he warned.' 6' While
158. TWINING, supra note 157, at 397 n.31 (quoting letter from Corbin which notes
that Williston asked Corbin to ensure that the Restatement was consistent with Hoh-
feldian analysis); Arthur L. Corbin, Samuel Williston, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1327 (1963); see
also Joseph M. Perillo, Twelve Letters from Arthur M. Corbin to Robert Braucher, 50
WASH. & LEE L. REV. (1993) (discussing Corbin's recollections of Restatement work).
159. GILMORE, supra note 3, at 82-83.
160. LIFE AND LAW, supra note 1, at 208.
161. Id. at 214. To the end of his career, he defended this position. In his last article,
published when he had reached the age of 88, he criticized the "firm offer" rule of the pro-
posed Uniform Commercial Code for not going far enough.
Section 2-205 proposes to change the existing law of contracts by making
binding without consideration an offer stated to be "firm" or otherwise irrevo-
cable for a period not exceeding three months.... I strongly favor enactment of
some such statute .... It is, however, unfortunate that there should be a differ-
ent rule for contracts for the sale of goods from that governing sales of shares of
stock or of land, or indeed for any other offer or promise. It would be better to




finding some merit in nearly all points of Llewellyn's methodology,
he felt "a direct frontal attack" was needed on one: "the belief in the
desirability of grouping legal situations in narrower categories than
has been customary, especially when the severance into different
categories is based merely on the fact that differences of decision
have heretofore existed. Such a line of thought... substitutes
precedent for reason. "162
In criticizing Legal Realism, Williston made again, verbatim,
the criticisms he had made of pre-Langdellian contract law. 163 He
reprinted word for word the sentences which had attacked complex-
ity and uncertainty, that had derided logomachy, and that had
praised principle as the basis for coherence and logical coordination.
Even his clinching metaphor was the same: "If the so-called func-
tional approach is pushed to its limit, a rule must be established for
each separate state of facts.... This would make of the law what
Tennyson called... a 'codeless myriad of precedent,' a 'wilderness of
single instances.'"'16
Seeing new issues in terms of old disputes, Williston mistook
Llewellyn for Parsons. This misjudgment cost him. Williston did not
contribute to the Realist solution, and so, to later generations, he
seemed more and more to have been part of the formalist problem.
The methodology he had championed fell into disrepute and finally
desuetude; Grant Gilmore called its decline the death of Contract.'65
Such errors do not bear repeating. To remain alert to the pos-
sibilities of the future, this last chapter of Williston's history sug-
gests, one should not cling to fixed judgments about the past. As to
our own past, re-examining Williston offers a start.
Re-examining Williston is a step toward understanding that
classical legal thought was not a monolithic ideology-that one can
think in terms of form and principle without becoming a vulgar for-
malist, just as one can draw on Marxist thinking without becoming a
vulgar Marxist. Llewellyn and Corbin dispelled the ancient phobia
of grappling with facts. Reassessing Williston may help dispel the
post-modern skepticism of logic and consistency. And ultimately we
may recognize the zig-zag continuity in how Williston rebelled
against Blackstone and Parsons and how Corbin and Llewellyn in
Samuel Williston, The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 63 HARV.
L. REV. 561, 576-77 (1950).
162. LIFE AND LAW, supra note 1, at 213.
163. Compare LIFE AND LAW, supra note 1, at 213 (criticizing Legal Realism) with
MODERN TENDENCIES, supra note 86, at 96-98 (criticizing pre-Langdellian contract law),
The later passage repeats the former, word for word; phrases first written as criticisms of
Parsons and his school are pressed into service as a criticism of Legal Realism.
164. LIFE AND LAW, supra note 1, at 208.
165. See generally GILmORE, supra note 96.
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turn broke away from Williston. If we properly understand such
ruptures, we may recognize that contract, rather than being a dead
body of theory, survives as a healthy tradition.

